[ANALYSIS] Holding the Centre: Why ASEAN must remain open in a fractured world

Hours later, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim took the podium and offered a very different message. Speaking with quiet determination, Anwar called not for confrontation, but for resilience—anchored in regional cooperation, multilateralism, and active non-alignment. Rather than echoing the clarion call for militarisation, he championed the “habits of cooperation” that have long served Southeast Asia: open trade, steady diplomacy, and a refusal to be drawn into great power rivalries.

Both speeches reflect the gravity of the current moment. But in tone and substance, Anwar’s message is better suited to the long-term security and prosperity of ASEAN and its 700 million citizens. The bloc has no interest in becoming the arena for a geopolitical showdown. It should not allow itself to be pulled apart by the gravitational tug of competing empires. Now, more than ever, Southeast Asia’s greatest strength lies in its unity—and in its ability to engage both the United States and China on its own terms.

The logic of deterrence, central to Hegseth’s speech, is not without merit. China’s actions in the South China Sea, its treatment of Taiwan, and its growing military footprint have generated unease across the region. But Hegseth’s demand for increased military spending risks misdiagnosing the problem. The real threat is not just external aggression—it is fragmentation from within.

If ASEAN members were to respond by aligning too closely with one side, they risk becoming proxies in a new cold war. As Anwar rightly pointed out, “The suggestion that if we do not align fully with one side, then we must have capitulated to the other, is untenable.” Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand have benefited enormously from strong ties with both China and the United States. China is the region’s largest trading partner. The U.S. remains a vital source of security, investment, and technological expertise. Being friends with both is not fence-sitting; it is strategic maturity.

That pragmatism is not unique to Malaysia. Across ASEAN, there is a clear preference for engagement, not entanglement. This was evident in recent efforts like the ASEAN-GCC-China trilateral initiative and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2045, which aims to deepen integration on jobs, connectivity, and sustainability. These are not the actions of countries preparing for war. They are the choices of nations preparing for the future.

Anwar’s speech correctly frames economic openness as part of the region’s security infrastructure. He recalled how trade and migration have shaped the region’s fortunes for centuries, from the Malacca Sultanate to modern-day data centres. “Trade is not a soft power indulgence,” he said. “It is part of our strategic architecture.”

This is not mere rhetoric. Fragmented trade, retaliatory tariffs, and supply chain disruptions have real consequences for Southeast Asian economies, most of which are export-driven. Currency volatility, food insecurity, and capital flight ignore national borders. A stable region is not one bristling with missiles, but one that keeps its trade routes open and its economies humming.

And yet, global trends are heading in the opposite direction. The return of industrial policy, decoupling between major powers, and the weaponisation of trade have injected uncertainty into a system that once promised shared growth. ASEAN must resist the urge to retreat inward. By harmonising standards, investing in digital infrastructure, and upholding rules-based trade, the bloc can remain an anchor of predictability.

The deeper point, often lost in the noise of great power speeches, is that ASEAN centrality still matters. The ten—soon to be eleven—member bloc may be slow, sometimes frustratingly so, but it remains the best available platform for collective action. It was never designed to project dominance. It exists to preserve space for dialogue and minimise the risks of conflict through consensus. This approach is not glamorous. It will not produce viral headlines or rapid breakthroughs. But it is resilient. And in today’s fractured world, that resilience is rare and precious.

Of course, ASEAN has its flaws. The situation in Myanmar continues to test the bloc’s credibility. Differences between member states on security policy and external alignment persist. But ASEAN’s habit of engagement—through summits, working groups, and quiet diplomacy—remains its strongest asset. When these habits are eroded, external powers find it easier to divide and dominate.

None of this is to suggest that Southeast Asia should ignore hard security realities. Deterrence has its place. So too does national defence. But as Anwar warned, “A stable region is not one braced for conflict, but one grounded in openness, transparency, and habit-forming cooperation.” The U.S. would do well to recognise that military spending is not the only metric of commitment.

Hegseth’s speech revealed a persistent challenge in U.S. diplomacy: the assumption that shared interests require uniform approaches. Southeast Asian countries are not junior partners. They are sovereign actors with diverse priorities and legitimate fears about becoming pawns in a superpower contest.

The best way for America to win friends in the region is not by demanding loyalty, but by respecting agency. That means supporting ASEAN initiatives, encouraging cross-border connectivity, and offering alternatives that are competitive—but not coercive.

In a world increasingly defined by rivalry and rupture, ASEAN’s patient, consensus-driven diplomacy may seem out of step. But it is precisely this model—rooted in openness, moderation and inclusivity—that the world needs more of.

If Southeast Asia can hold its centre—by speaking with one voice, engaging all sides, and standing firm on its own values—it will not only preserve its autonomy. It may also help to shape a more stable order for everyone else.

* Dr Helmy Haja Mydin is chairman of Social & Economic Research Initiative ** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.