Behind 'amazing' Trump-Xi talks, a new era of confrontation

Back in the United States, thousands of employees at NASA and its subordinate contractors continue to work unpaid as one of the longest federal government shutdowns ever approaches its second month. They are all part of an increasingly intense effort to beat China in returning human astronauts to the surface of the moon before Trump leaves office in early 2029.

Thursday’s Trump-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in South Korea built on what has become a growing post-pandemic tradition of U.S. and Chinese leaders meeting face-to-face.

While the Biden-era meetings that began with a video call in November 2021 and progressed to annual face-to-face sessions in 2022 focused on ways to avoid risks of accidental conflict, this week’s Trump-Xi talks focused heavily on de-escalating – or at least pausing – the growing U.S.-China trade war.

But the muted response from markets to the meeting indicated a much broader view that the Trump-Xi rapprochement reflected just a temporary pause in growing Sino-U.S. tensions, and that for all the talk of Washington and Beijing forming a “G2” to address major issues, their status as rivals will continue to drive wider geopolitical instability.

According to Trump, the thorny topic of Taiwan – raised by the Chinese side in each of the meetings during Joe Biden's administration preceding Trump's – was not directly mentioned.

Instead, the two leaders negotiated a reduction in U.S. tariffs in return for a resumption of Chinese exports of rare earths and a greater effort by Beijing to crack down on the supply of precursor chemicals fuelling the fentanyl drug epidemic in the United States.

Speaking to journalists on Air Force One immediately after, Trump declared the meeting an “amazing” success, adding that on a scale of 1 to 10 it had been at least a “12”.

Beijing too appeared keen to paint the meeting not just as a success itself, with the two leaders scheduled to meet again in China in April and in the U.S. later in 2026. “China’s development and rejuvenation are not incompatible with President Trump's goal of 'Making America Great Again'," Xi said.

That language, though, will do little to mitigate concerns among many of America’s closest allies – as well as the U.S. foreign policy elite – that the Trump administration and those that back it remain more interested in striking bargains with expansionist and autocratic rivals than defending long-standing major democracies.

The fact Taiwan appears not to have been discussed at all might be seen by some as an indicator that the U.S. and Chinese positions on the island remain fundamentally irreconcilable – China has spent this month doubling down on its assertion that bringing the island under mainland control remains a top priority, explicitly part of its next “five-year plan”.

Chinese political rhetoric presents that as a political inevitability. But while Beijing has repeatedly said it prefers that process to be peaceful, U.S. officials say China’s colossal military buildup over recent years has been explicitly driven by the desire to be able to win a war for Taiwan as soon as 2027, even if the U.S. intervenes to protect the island.

SHIPBUILDING, TROOPS AND ALLIED NERVOUSNESS

Deterring Beijing from making such a move is now a key driver of U.S. military expansion – and, behind the scenes, negotiating deals with Japan and South Korea to allow their massive shipyards to be used in the event of a Taiwan conflict was a key part of the U.S. agenda on Trump's Pacific trip.

Beijing, however, appears to see clear opportunity in a rather different narrative.

As APEC leaders convene this weekend in prayer after Trump’s departure, Chinese officials and media say Beijing intends to push a message of “Chinese common sense” and commitment to a “multilateral world”.

What that really means, analysts and officials say, is that China is quietly but forcibly presenting itself as the coming future global power – particularly in the Pacific, but also much more globally – in comparison with an increasingly isolationist and politically unpredictable United States.

It is a message those in Beijing appear to believe Trump’s trade war rhetoric and actions this year as well as global disquiet over Israel’s war in Gaza may well help them get across.

America’s federal government shutdown – soon to enter its second month – may also dent the U.S. image, as has the Trump administration's far-flung crackdown on immigration.

But for all China’s talk of cooperation, it is Beijing’s increasing willingness to resort to coercion and threats that has countries most concerned - from naval exercises apparently designed to intimidate regional nations from Japan to Australia – as well as Taiwan and the Philippines in particular – to its ability to exploit its domination of key supply chains.

Speaking last weekend, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned of “clear acceleration and escalation in the way interdependencies are being leveraged and weaponised”.

That appeared to be a reference both to China’s rare-earth supply controls and its growing stranglehold over clean energy technology including batteries and solar panels.

Equally disquieting to the Europeans – as well as those U.S. allies and partners closer to China itself – is Beijing’s ongoing tacit support of Russia in its invasion of Ukraine.

According to Trump, his discussion with Xi on Thursday steered clear of talk of sanctioning China yet more heavily for its purchases of Russian energy.

That omission by Trump, like his very meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska earlier this year, is likely to further drive concerns that both the president and possible successors in the White House see themselves doing deals with Moscow and Beijing impacting the fate of other nations.

Such concerns have been compounded by repeated delays in releasing the Pentagon’s upcoming global review of U.S. military posture, expected in August or September.

That is reportedly the subject of a significant dispute within the Trump administration, some favouring a global U.S. military pullback and others still keen to keep significant forces forward in the Pacific.

SPACE, TAIWAN AND NUKES

Addressing U.S. military personnel in Japan, Trump again hit his frequent talking points on attacking his domestic political enemies and vowing to keep America militarily powerful.

Shortly before meeting Xi on Thursday, he also announced he had ordered the U.S. military to resume nuclear testing should Russia and China do likewise.

But as the Pentagon pulls America’s newest and largest aircraft carrier USS Gerald R Ford back from Europe to the Caribbean, there is growing concern in the U.S. and beyond that Trump and those around him are most concerned with maintaining and bolstering U.S. clout in their immediate neighbourhood, especially underlined by a growing confrontation with Venezuela.

For all that, the administration clearly knows it can ill afford publicly to lose a major contest to China, both internationally and when it comes to U.S. domestic politics.

That includes growing nervousness in the U.S. that China now has a better than even chance of winning the race to return astronauts to the surface of the moon, something Beijing has pledged to do by 2030.

This month, acting NASA administrator and U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy vowed the U.S. would conduct its own landing before Trump leaves office in early 2029.

With Elon Musk-owned SpaceX believed to be well behind schedule on its part of the project, NASA has reopened that contract to other firms, pledging to build a working lunar landing vehicle in the next three years.

NASA has also brought forward the likely launch date of “Artemis 2”, set to fly three U.S. and one Canadian astronaut around the moon in the most ambitious manned space mission in more than 50 years, to February from April.

Messaging on Taiwan, however, remains considerably more messy.

Ever since 1979, successive U.S. administrations have maintained what has been known as “strategic ambiguity” over whether they would intervene militarily to protect the island from attack.

But on that front, the Trump administration has been considerably more ambiguous than its Biden-era predecessor.

That is already having an effect – and one Beijing looks keen to take advantage of.

A poll this month by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation found 45% of respondents believed the Trump administration would not be willing to fight to protect the island, with only 34% saying they believed it would do so.

That has coincided with a substantial uptick in Chinese messaging, including for the first time giving details of how the Communist mainland might administer Taiwan, including pledges to respect private property and hand power to “patriotic” pro-mainland forces in Taiwan.

Clearly, Beijing wants Taiwan under its control – and should that happen, with or without a fight, it would be seen as a significant and lasting blow to U.S. power and prestige in the Pacific and beyond.

Simply ignoring that issue may have smoothed the Trump-Xi talks on Thursday, but the era of confrontation with Beijing is likely only going to intensify.