China and the United States can co-exist, but not reconcile all differences

The Nature of Co-Existence

The U.S. and China are bound together by an unprecedented scale of interdependence. Despite tariffs and decoupling rhetoric, China remains America’s largest trading partner in goods, while U.S. financial institutions and investors continue to seek access to Chinese markets. In supply chains, whether in semiconductors, rare earth minerals, or green technology, each side retains leverage over the other.

This interdependence ensures that outright confrontation, such as total economic separation or military escalation, would be catastrophic for both and ruinous for global prosperity. Thus, coexistence is not merely a choice, but an inevitability dictated by structural realities.

Yet coexistence does not mean reconciliation. On matters of ideology, the gap is simply too wide. The United States anchors its legitimacy on liberal democracy, human rights, and rule-based order, while China emphasises sovereignty, non-interference, and the primacy of state-led development. These principles collide in global forums, from the United Nations to ASEAN meetings, whenever issues like Xinjiang, Taiwan, or the South China Sea arise.

Similarly, in security and strategy, Washington’s hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia directly contrasts with Beijing’s desire to push U.S. forces farther away from its maritime periphery. Even when both sides speak of “stability,” they envision it differently—America through deterrence and alliances, China through spheres of influence and gradual rebalancing of power.

To reconcile all differences would require one side to fundamentally alter its identity and worldview. Neither Washington nor Beijing is prepared to do that. The U.S. will not abandon its global primacy, and China will not forgo its ambition to regain what it views as its rightful centrality in Asia. At best, they can compartmentalise disputes, set guardrails, and prevent crises from spiralling out of control.

The recent dialogues on climate cooperation, fentanyl controls, and military-to-military communication are examples of pragmatic coexistence. But when it comes to core issues—Taiwan, technological supremacy, or leadership in global governance—the disagreements are structural, not tactical. They cannot be reconciled through mere diplomatic compromise.

For ASEAN, this paradox creates both peril and opportunity. The region benefits from U.S.–China coexistence, as it drives trade, investment, and regional growth. Yet ASEAN is also at risk when their rivalry turns sharp, as seen in technology export bans, maritime standoffs, and competing infrastructure projects. Thus, ASEAN must learn to engage both powers without demanding reconciliation. Instead, it should build mechanisms—through the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and the evolving “ASEAN Troika”—to ensure that coexistence does not collapse into confrontation.

The world should not confuse coexistence with reconciliation. The United States and China can co-exist because they must; their economic, technological, and environmental interdependence leaves no other option. But they cannot reconcile all differences because their ideologies, security perceptions, and strategic ambitions diverge too fundamentally.

The task for global actors, including ASEAN, is not to wish away this reality, but to create channels that sustain peaceful coexistence despite irreconcilable differences. This is not defeatism—it is realism.

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Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies and Director of the Institute of Internationaliation and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS) at the International Islamic University Malaysia. Luthfy Hamzah is Senior Research Fellow at IINTAS and a specialist in trade, political economy, and strategic diplomacy in Northeast Asia. ** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.