China can be a good security partner in Indo-China: But all must concurrently reduce maritime tensions

Naval and air manoeuvres far from China’s coast are rarely seen as neutral. In a time of strategic rivalry, such actions signal response times, alliance coordination, and political will.

For Japan, these manoeuvres reinforce a deep-seated fear of strategic surprise.

For the United States, these manoeuvres reinforce the demands of extended deterrence in Japan and Southeast Asia. However, the situation is more nuanced.

ASEAN states do not wish to be trapped in great-power competition. They seek stability, economic continuity, and diplomatic space.

This is why the idea of China as a constructive security partner—rather than a perpetual source of tension—warrants serious consideration.

China’s official position is that its military activities are lawful, defensive, and comparable to those of other major powers. It is true that all states test readiness and conduct exercises.

China’s sudden, opaque, or contested-area drills increase anxiety among its neighbours.

The real issue is reassurance, which remains insufficient.

This is regrettable, as China has repeatedly shown it can play a stabilizing role when it chooses to do so.

China, for example, has demonstrated that it can act as a responsible security interlocutor by agreeing to help pacify the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, lending its diplomatic weight to de-escalation rather than escalation.

In doing so, Beijing signalled that it understands the value of restraint and dialogue in mainland Southeast Asia, where conflicts—if left unmanaged—can easily spiral beyond control.

Such behaviour demonstrates that China can act as a mediator, stabilizer, and conflict-management partner—not solely as a coercive power.

This is consistent with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' long-standing priorities of confidence-building, quiet diplomacy, and the avoidance of open conflict.

When China follows these principles, it strengthens ASEAN centrality.

The challenge arises when this constructive approach on land is not matched at sea.

Maritime tensions—especially in the South China Sea—remain the greatest obstacle to China’s trust with neighbours.

Overlapping claims, militarization, and coercive signalling have created a persistent sense of insecurity among littoral states.

Even when China speaks of peaceful negotiation, its actions at sea are often perceived as fait accompli. This disconnects between rhetoric and practice erodes confidence.

The Pacific manoeuvres reported by Japanese media must therefore be understood within a broader pattern. They reinforce the belief that China prefers strategic ambiguity backed by superior force.

Such ambiguity may deter adversaries, but it also unsettles smaller states. In maritime Southeast Asia—where sea lanes are economic lifelines—uncertainty is destabilizing.

This uncertainty encourages hedging, arms acquisition, and deeper reliance on external powers—outcomes China says it seeks to avoid.

If China wants to be a credible security partner in Indo-China and the Indo-Pacific, it must reduce maritime tensions in clear, tangible ways. First, increase transparency.

Greater transparency should involve advance notification of major exercises, clearer rules for air and naval encounters, and robust crisis-management mechanisms—all steps that would significantly reduce the risk of miscalculation.

Recommitting to international maritime norms means visibly supporting freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Third, China must embrace multilateralism not merely as diplomatic theatre but as a security practice. ASEAN’s preference for inclusive dialogue and codes of conduct reflects the hard-earned lessons of a region that has experienced war, intervention, and division.

A meaningful, enforceable South China Sea Code of Conduct would show China values restraint as much as resolve.

None of this requires China to abandon its core interests, which great powers typically do not do.

Strategic empathy is required: understand how others interpret defensive actions.

Japan’s security posture is shaped by history and geography. America’s presence is shaped by alliance commitments.

Southeast Asia’s caution comes from vulnerability. Ignoring this may give a short-term advantage but hurts long-term legitimacy.

Persistent maritime tensions undermine China’s ambitions; economic integration and connectivity depend on stable seas and mutual confidence.

Even China’s aspiration to shape regional institutions depends on others' willingness to see it as a partner rather than a disruptor. Security cooperation cannot flourish in an atmosphere of constant stress testing.

China must choose reassurance or rivalry. Its diplomacy in Thailand-Cambodia shows that diplomacy works.

If China extends restraint and cooperation to maritime issues, it can become a respected security partner in Indo-China and beyond.

Without such change, manoeuvres will be seen as tests, assurances as conditional, and partnership opportunities as fleeting.