Cyber crimes in ASEAN: A networked plague now infecting Indonesia

On June 13, Indonesian police carried out coordinated raids across Bogor, Bekasi, Tangerang, and Denpasar, arresting 22 individuals who were allegedly part of a highly organized network running illicit gambling operations. Using thousands of Indonesian SIM cards, the group was setting up as many as 500 WhatsApp accounts daily.

These accounts promoted illegal platforms like Tanjung899 and Akasia899, all while laundering proceeds through Indonesian bank accounts and cryptocurrencies.

The figures speak for themselves: more than 2,600 SIM cards, 354 mobile phones, and multiple computers were seized alongside cars and ATM cards. Authorities estimate the network’s earnings in the hundreds of billions of rupiah annually.

The Financial Services Authority of Indonesia (OJK) has already taken action by freezing more than 17,000 bank accounts linked to online gambling. For all that is known, this is merely the tip of the iceberg. But the implications are far more dire than the numbers suggest.

This is not merely a story of vice and greed—it is a cautionary tale of how cybercrime thrives in a region beset by fragmented regulations, digital vulnerabilities, and uneven law enforcement. As Southeast Asia’s digital economy booms, criminal networks have evolved in parallel, exploiting the very openness and connectivity that undergirds regional growth.

Cambodia’s own crackdown—taking place almost simultaneously—is revealing.

More than 1,000 arrests were made over just three days across provinces like Phnom Penh, Poipet, and Sihanoukville. These provinces are infamous for hosting scam compounds tied to foreign criminal syndicates.

Victims, often trafficked into forced cyber-fraud labour, include citizens from China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Indonesia.

Amnesty International has long warned of the darker underbelly of this digital crime wave: human trafficking, slavery, and torture.

Yet for years, responses from regional authorities have been tepid. That tide is now beginning to shift, but the question remains—has the response come too late?

In Indonesia, Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka has publicly warned that government subsidies (BSU wage aid) are being diverted into online gambling. Government agencies are now tracing these funds and closing down accounts used for such illicit activities. This marks a rare admission from the highest levels of government that economic welfare programs are being subverted by criminal greed.

The deeper irony is unmistakable. Just as ASEAN positions itself as a digitally integrated economic bloc—with initiatives ranging from e-commerce cooperation to digital payment harmonization—its borders remain porous to criminal misuse of those same technologies. If ASEAN becomes a digital hub without becoming a digital fortress, it will pay a steep price.

The architecture of these crimes is telling: they are transnational, decentralized, and technically sophisticated.

They exploit virtual assets and digital messaging platforms while hiding behind jurisdictions where cybercrime laws remain vague, unenforced, or riddled with loopholes.

The use of Indonesian SIM cards to establish thousands of WhatsApp numbers illustrates how seemingly benign national infrastructure—cheap mobile plans, loose SIM registration, weak financial surveillance—becomes a gateway for global criminal operations.

Cambodia’s recent arrests and Indonesia’s proactive raids should not be seen in isolation.

They are part of a larger pattern across ASEAN—one that includes Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and even parts of Malaysia and the Philippines—where scam compounds, illegal betting hubs, and human trafficking rings have become embedded within local economies. In some cases, these operations are tacitly allowed to function because they generate cash flows, employment, or even bribes. But such short-term tolerance can have long-term consequences.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has estimated that Southeast Asia could be losing anywhere between $18 billion to $37 billion annually to cyber-enabled crimes and scams.

These losses are not just financial. They erode trust in digital governance, undermine law enforcement, and sow social instability.

In this complex ecosystem, regional cooperation is not a luxury—it is a necessity.

ASEANAPOL, the law enforcement coordination mechanism of ASEAN, must be urgently empowered and expanded.

It must develop specialized cybercrime task forces with real-time data sharing capabilities, joint investigations, and AI-driven analytics to trace digital money trails. Without this, ASEAN nations will continue to act alone and piecemeal—perpetually reactive, never preventive.

At the same time, Track II diplomacy must not be underestimated.

Quiet cooperation between ASEAN, China, and even the United States is essential to dismantling these syndicates, many of which rely on cross-border digital platforms and payment systems that cannot be neutralized without multilateral engagement. Despite their political and trade rivalries, the U.S. and China share a common enemy in cybercrime. ASEAN can be the broker of that cooperation.

The danger now is not merely that online gambling will grow. It is that public trust in financial systems, digital infrastructure, and even social safety nets will deteriorate.

When government aid is hijacked by gambling apps, when a young person’s first digital experience is being lured into a scam, or when a country’s cybersecurity is dictated by scam syndicates more than sovereign rules, the rot runs deeper than headlines can capture.

Indonesia’s bust is a victory, yes—but also a warning.

If ASEAN does not wake up to the scale and spread of cybercrime—one that respects no borders but exploits every digital opportunity—then the region’s ambition to become a digitally secure and prosperous community will remain an illusion.

Cambodia, Indonesia, and the rest of ASEAN must now move beyond symbolic enforcement and into a phase of strategic, sustained digital defence.

Because in the age of cybercrime, the region’s greatest threat is no longer just who crosses its borders—but what does so invisibly, at the speed of light.

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Phar Kim Beng is Director of the Institute of Internationalization and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS), Professor of ASEAN Studies in International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) and a former Head Teaching Fellow at Harvard University.