East Asia Summit through the optic of Sino US bilateralism

ASEAN's Multilateralism vs. Bilateral Impulses

Both Washington and Beijing have historically preferred bilateralism over multilateralism when it comes to settling major strategic disputes. For the U.S., especially under Trump, multilateral platforms are seen less as venues for consensus-building and more as arenas of diluted sovereignty and constrained leverage.

Trump has long framed international summits—especially those organized by multilateral institutions—as forums where America is made to carry too much of the burden while receiving too little in return.

China, for its part, while formally respectful of ASEAN-led platforms, often approaches such summits with strategic caution. The East Asian Summit may be on Beijing's official calendar, but its real diplomatic heavy lifting occurs in quiet rooms in Geneva, London, or at the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. Beijing's diplomacy is tightly choreographed and issue-specific, avoiding unpredictability and unscripted confrontation—exactly the kind of atmosphere Trump's erratic style thrives in.

President Trump thrives on spectacle and domination. In his first term, he claimed a personal triumph by negotiating a USD 250 billion Phase One trade deal with China—one which he insisted bore his signature approach of "maximum pressure." Trump believes that when it comes to dealing with Xi Jinping, only he—personally—can deliver for the American people. He is unlikely to relegate such sensitive negotiations to Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick or the current Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Nor will he tolerate his role being perceived as ceremonial or peripheral within a multilateral setting like the EAS.

Moreover, Trump wants the spotlight, and in a summit where 18 leaders must share the stage, the optics do not favour his personality-driven diplomacy. Trump’s participation would demand that the summit be reshaped around him—a diplomatic impossibility for ASEAN, whose very brand is built on consensus, neutrality, and collegiality.

Xi Jinping, in stark contrast, operates within a Chinese political framework that elevates precision and preparation over spontaneity. Every meeting, every statement, and every deal is vetted, rehearsed, and presented with clinical efficiency. Xi’s aversion to unpredictable diplomatic theatre makes him wary of platforms where his control over the messaging could be disrupted—especially by a U.S. President known for going off-script.

The style gap between Trump and Xi could not be wider. Trump demands visible dominance; Xi insists on protocol and parity. Trump improvises, Xi plans. These differences alone are sufficient to sink any likelihood of a summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur. There is simply no alignment of incentives, atmospherics, or diplomatic mechanics to make such a meeting worthwhile for either leader.

Looking further down the calendar, 2026 and 2027 are not promising either. The Philippines and Singapore are next in line to host the ASEAN Summit, but these venues do little to increase the appeal for either Trump or Xi. For Trump, the U.S. midterm elections in 2026 will absorb all his attention. Historically, presidents avoid foreign travel during politically sensitive periods unless a clear win is on the horizon. Moreover, given that neither Manila nor Singapore has agreed to the Trump Administration’s push for a 5 percent defence spending target as a share of GDP, there’s little reason for Trump to extend himself diplomatically for their summits either.

And while Singapore enjoys cordial ties with both China and the U.S., its strong emphasis on neutrality, law, and technocratic governance does not provide the political optics that Trump finds energizing or exploitable. Neither does the Philippines—especially if Sara Duterte's potential realignment with the U.S. remains clouded by ongoing ICC investigations of her father. The risk of controversy may outweigh the diplomatic reward.

Further reducing the incentive for Trump’s personal attendance is the active diplomatic shuttle diplomacy already underway. Defense Secretary Peter Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have already made multiple trips to Southeast Asia, reinforcing U.S. defense ties, pushing for market access, and signalling support for ASEAN unity—on Washington’s terms.

Trump may see their visits as sufficient—especially since he has little patience for ceremonial presence without a corresponding transactional benefit. In Trump’s worldview, if deals can be delivered without his presence, and if ASEAN leaders cannot offer major concessions—military or market-based—then a trip to Kuala Lumpur is expendable.

Malaysia, as the Chair of ASEAN and host of the East Asia Summit in 2025, faces a critical dilemma. It must be seen as an honest broker and a neutral platform, yet it must also recognize that the global strategic competition has entered a phase where great powers no longer find value in consensus-building processes unless they deliver high-impact, tangible outcomes.

Kuala Lumpur may work quietly behind the scenes to encourage both leaders to attend. And Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim may even leverage his strong civilizational diplomacy approach to frame the summit as a space for values-based dialogue. But ASEAN’s soft power, while respected, does not always move the strategic calculus of hard power actors like Trump or Xi.

While it is symbolically powerful for the ASEAN Chair to invite both Trump and Xi to the East Asian Summit, the likelihood of success remains low—if not abysmal. The structural contradictions, personality mismatches, and political calendars all point to a summit where deputies, not principals, will carry the torch. Unless Trump or Xi sees a direct domestic or international advantage in attending—and is assured that their respective styles will not be undermined—the Kuala Lumpur summit will proceed without the dramatic headline of a Trump-Xi showdown.

And perhaps that is a blessing in disguise. The East Asian Summit, at its best, is a platform for patient diplomacy—not a boxing ring for superpowers seeking supremacy.

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Phar Kim Beng is Director of the Institute of Internationalization and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS), Professor of ASEAN Studies in International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) and a former Head Teaching Fellow at Harvard University.