The end that is not the end to the nuclear imbroglio in Iran

Yet again, the Trump administration has chosen rhetorical bravado over forensic clarity. At the heart of the issue lies not only a paradox of perception—between military claims and verifiable reality—but also a larger geopolitical recalibration involving U.S., Israeli, Iranian, and Chinese strategic stakes.

Most crucially, a growing body of satellite and intelligence analysis casts serious doubt on whether the so-called super bunker buster bombs deployed—Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs)—achieved any of the irreversible damage Trump claims.

Fordow is one of Iran’s most heavily fortified nuclear facilities, buried under 80 meters of rock and reinforced concrete. Its strategic design makes it exceedingly difficult to destroy through air strikes alone.

The MOPs, originally designed to penetrate hardened underground bunkers like those in North Korea, were indeed deployed in the June 22 strikes. However, military experts caution that even MOPs have limitations, particularly when their deployment is rushed and unverified by third-party intelligence on target movements and pre-emptive evacuations.

In the days leading up to the strike, satellite imagery from commercial and military sources showed large convoys of trucks entering and exiting the Fordow site, consistent with the removal of high-value equipment, sensitive documents, and potentially enriched uranium stockpiles.

These movements were picked up by analysts across multiple agencies, including within the U.S. Department of Defense and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), though the latter has since been sidelined politically and diplomatically.

If, as these reports suggest, Iran had already cleared out the most vital components of its nuclear operations, then the U.S. strike—no matter how visually dramatic—would have hit an emptied facility, inflicting symbolic rather than strategic damage.

In contrast to Trump’s chest-thumping claims of “obliteration,” the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has provided a far more measured analysis: Iran’s nuclear program has been “delayed” rather than destroyed.

According to DIA officials cited in classified briefings, Fordow’s damage was partial, possibly confined to the outer layers or access tunnels, and did not impact core centrifuge halls that had likely been decommissioned prior to the strike. Worse still, the attack may have inadvertently strengthened Iran’s resolve to pursue nuclear deterrence. Historically, nations under attack have accelerated—not abandoned—nuclear development. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Libya under Gaddafi, and even North Korea after the U.S. invasion of Iraq all responded by doubling down on nuclear research.

What makes this episode even more surreal is Trump’s subsequent offer to reopen diplomatic ties with Iran. Within days of the Fordow strike, Trump floated the idea that Iran and the U.S. could be “great friends” again, bizarrely suggesting that the bombing of critical infrastructure could be a precursor to peace.

This behaviour aligns with Trump’s broader pattern of narcissistic foreign policy-making—driven not by strategic goals but by theatrical optics and a craving for accolades, including the elusive Nobel Peace Prize he has long coveted.

But such overtures ring hollow. Diplomacy cannot be built on the smouldering ruins of nuclear sites, especially when there is no third-party verification mechanism in place.

The IAEA, which should be the cornerstone of verification and trust-building, has been reduced to a bystander. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and Israel’s continuous scepticism of the agency’s impartiality, Iran’s trust in the IAEA has evaporated.

In Tehran’s view, the IAEA is no longer a neutral body but a Western-aligned instrument of pressure. Thus, any renewed inspections—particularly after Israeli intelligence allegedly infiltrated Fordow—are highly unlikely to be welcomed. The era of voluntary transparency in Iran’s nuclear policy is effectively over.

While Trump postures and the Pentagon parses impact reports, China and the US remain locked in their focus on Iran—each for strategic but diverging reasons.

For Washington, Iran is a potential nuclear flashpoint, a theatre to project power, and a testbed for its deterrence credibility. For Beijing, Iran is not a threat but a partner—economically vital and strategically indispensable to its long-term Eurasian vision.

Iran’s geographic position at the crossroads of the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean gives it outsized importance in China’s energy diversification and trade routes.

Beijing’s consistent opposition to sanctions and preference for diplomacy positions it as a more reliable interlocutor for Tehran, especially in the wake of Western strikes and diplomatic betrayals.

This contrast reinforces the global perception that China offers a more stable and long-term strategic alternative, while U.S. policies remain volatile and often transactional.

If Trump’s intent was to isolate Iran and diminish its regional and global ties, the reality may be the opposite: his military aggression risks pushing Iran further into China’s strategic orbit, where mutual distrust of the West fosters tighter cooperation.

For ASEAN nations, the episode offers valuable strategic insight. It underscores the risks of over-militarized diplomacy, especially when global institutions like the IAEA are undermined or manipulated.

ASEAN’s long-standing emphasis on neutrality, multilateral dialogue, and nuclear non-proliferation—enshrined in ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality) and SEANWFZ (Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone)—serves as a counter-model to the chaos wrought in the Middle East.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, as Chair of ASEAN, has repeatedly affirmed the importance of rules-based international order and peaceful conflict resolution.

The Fordow incident reinforces the need for ASEAN to speak with one voice in favour of verifiable disarmament and against unilateral aggression, no matter how advanced the weaponry used.

In the final analysis, the so-called obliteration of Fordow is more political theatre than military victory. Without third-party verification, without a diplomatic follow-through, and with Iran’s strategic assets likely evacuated before the strike, Trump’s operation appears to have achieved little beyond headlines.

Instead of closing the nuclear chapter with Iran, it has reopened an even more volatile one—where trust has eroded, verification is impossible, and geopolitical alignments are shifting in ways that may haunt U.S. policymakers for years to come.

China and the US remain locked in their focus on Iran, but their approaches could not be more different: one seeks dominance through disruption, the other influence through persistence.

In this sense, the strike on Fordow may well be the end that is not the end—just another beginning in the long and dangerous nuclear imbroglio of the Middle East.

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Phar Kim Beng is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and a former Head Teaching Fellow at Harvard University and And Luthfy Hamzah is Senior Research Fellow, Strategic Pan Indo Pacific Arena (SPIPA)