[OPINION] The US Indo-Pacific strategy: From demands to misunderstandings

For ASEAN, the proposal is not only fiscally impractical but strategically tone-deaf. It echoes a misguided belief that security in Asia can be built through military parity alone. In fact, the core problem is not that ASEAN is reluctant to spend on defense, but that U.S. policymakers continue to misunderstand what constitutes security in this part of the world.

ASEAN nations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia have made it clear—both publicly and privately—that NATO-style defense spending targets do not align with their national priorities or fiscal capacity. The suggestion to leap from 1–2% of GDP to 5% would divert massive public resources from urgent domestic needs: education, healthcare, climate adaptation, and economic recovery post-COVID-19.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia rightly reaffirmed the policy of “active non-alignment,” insisting that Malaysia—and by extension ASEAN—should not be forced to choose sides in the escalating U.S.–China rivalry. Instead, ASEAN seeks to preserve its strategic autonomy, allowing it to engage with all powers without subservience to any.

This approach is not naivety. It reflects hard-earned lessons from history. Southeast Asia’s colonial past, its Cold War entanglements, and the economic interdependence it shares with both East and West have taught its leaders that security cannot be achieved through militarization alone.

Hegseth’s criticisms of China’s assertiveness over Taiwan and the South China Sea may resonate with hawks in Washington, but they carry less weight in a region that also watches America’s own inconsistencies with growing unease.

Consider this: while calling for greater military spending from Asian partners, the Trump administration continues to impose punitive tariffs on Southeast Asian exports—including semiconductors, steel, and electronics. These measures not only dampen trade but also erode the fiscal capacity of ASEAN governments to allocate more to defense. At the same time, the Trump administration has openly floated the idea of troop drawdowns from Korea and possibly Japan, shifting the burden of regional security without clear guarantees of continued American presence.

This paradox—demanding more while giving less—has not gone unnoticed. As one Southeast Asian defense official put it during a closed-door session, “How can we trust a partner that insists we pay more but offers no long-term commitment in return?”

In today’s Asia, economic stability, infrastructure development, and regional connectivity carry greater strategic value than military buildups. China remains ASEAN’s largest trading partner, and initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) are seen as more tangible avenues for long-term security and prosperity than costly defense programs.

This is not to suggest ASEAN is blind to military risks. Maritime security, cyber threats, and gray zone challenges such as IUU fishing, trafficking, and disinformation are very real. But the appropriate tools to address them lie not in aircraft carriers and missiles, but in coast guard cooperation, maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity partnerships, and climate resilience planning.

ASEAN does not reject the U.S. role in the region—far from it. But it does reject the idea that such a role must be defined on American terms alone. True partnership must be grounded in mutual respect, not one-sided prescriptions.

As Prime Minister Anwar succinctly stated, strategic autonomy is the only way to ensure ASEAN remains a credible force in shaping regional order. “We do not want to be the pawns of any great power,” he noted in a press conference following the Dialogue. That statement, though diplomatic, was also a rebuke of Hegseth’s tone.

For the U.S. to regain trust and traction in Southeast Asia, it must shift from issuing ultimatums to offering understanding. That means investing in people, not just arms; supporting ASEAN centrality, not bypassing it; and addressing shared non-traditional security concerns—from pandemics to environmental degradation—on terms ASEAN finds relevant.

America must understand that in this region, security is not simply the absence of war but the presence of opportunity. The Indo-Pacific does not need to be a battlefield of alignments but a platform for inclusive development.

If Washington truly values its alliances in Asia, it must learn to listen—not just to its own fears about China, but to the aspirations of the region itself.