A strategic Move to Paris is a plus for ASEAN especially if France aspires for dialogue partnership

France is frequently misunderstood as a purely European power. In truth, it is a global player with the largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world—over 11 million square kilometres—thanks to its overseas territories scattered across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. From Réunion Island in the southwest Indian Ocean to New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna in the Pacific, France maintains a sprawling maritime presence that grants it enormous strategic leverage across both oceanic regions. These territories are not merely remnants of a colonial past but integral components of France’s 21st-century strategic doctrine, particularly under President Emmanuel Macron.

President Macron has repeatedly emphasized France’s Indo-Pacific vision. In June 2025, Macron was the keynote speaker at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, a rare and powerful gesture underscoring France’s Indo-Pacific engagement. Anwar was a keynote speaker in Shangri La Dialogue too. Anwar and Macron have already met in Singapore once. At a time when Malaysia and Singapore relationship are on an uptick.

At any rate, Macron's remarks were bold, reflecting a France that seeks autonomy from U.S.-China rivalry while simultaneously affirming its military and diplomatic stakes in the region. This year alone, Macron has met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto—both before and after the most recent ASEAN Summit—signalling a sustained French pivot towards Southeast Asia. France has also deepened defence, nuclear, and technological cooperation with both nations.

The French Indo-Pacific strategy dovetails neatly with ASEAN’s evolving trajectory. As Timor-Leste is poised to become ASEAN’s 11th member by October 2025, ASEAN’s geographic reach will soon include the Pacific Ocean for the first time.

This expansion represents not only a symbolic redefinition of ASEAN’s scope but also a concrete geopolitical reality: ASEAN now faces the Pacific, where France retains substantial strategic stakes. In this context, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s engagement with France is a move aligned with both ASEAN’s institutional evolution and regional security dynamics.

Crucially, France is currently a Development Partner of ASEAN. While this designation has its merits—offering economic and technical cooperation—it is no longer sufficient in the face of growing geopolitical complexities. France is the only Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council that has yet to elevate itself to Comprehensive Strategic Partner (CSP) status with ASEAN. China, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom have all reached this tier of strategic recognition, granting them greater influence in shaping ASEAN’s external relations and in regional diplomacy. It is time France steps into this circle.

The logic for France’s elevation is compelling. First, France brings tangible maritime capabilities to the Indo-Pacific, including naval deployments and a permanent military presence in the region.

These assets are crucial in a time when freedom of navigation, maritime security, and counter-piracy operations are of paramount concern to Southeast Asia, especially in the South China Sea and increasingly tense Pacific theatre. France has participated in joint patrols and exercises with ASEAN member states and could offer an alternative security partner in an era of U.S.-China polarization.

Second, France’s technological and green energy prowess aligns with ASEAN’s priority areas. As the region pivots towards sustainability and digital transformation, French expertise in nuclear energy, renewable technologies, space innovation, and artificial intelligence becomes highly relevant.

Prime Minister Anwar’s visit to Paris—anticipated to include dialogues with key French energy and tech firms—should be leveraged to establish sectoral frameworks for ASEAN-wide cooperation. France’s investments in high-speed rail, smart cities, and digital infrastructure could serve as templates for regional integration. Third, France’s diplomatic posture—often one of strategic autonomy—resonates with ASEAN’s doctrine of neutrality and non-alignment. France does not seek to impose a bloc mentality.

Just as China is against any bloc politics reminiscent of the Cold War too. A view that South Korea and Japan can take seriously with the proviso that their relationship with Beijing can continue to improve in trade in order to reduce any tensions in the East China Sea.

Anwar's trip to France is therefore geopolitically and geo economically sensible for all sides.

Professor Ruhanas Harun, once trained at Sorbonne and Sciences Po is one of the top authorities on France.

She is based in National Defence University of Malaysia, while Professor David Camroux in Sciences Po is no less familiar with ASEAN and Indo Pacific issues. The pair forms a formidable Track 2 channel.

Rather, it supports multilateralism, international law, and inclusive dialogue. This mirrors ASEAN’s approach to conflict management and regional stability. In this sense, France is a natural partner to reinforce ASEAN Centrality and support the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).

With the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to be held in Kuala Lumpur from July 9 to 11, 2025, the timing is ripe. ARF remains one of the few platforms where ASEAN engages all major powers—including the U.S., China, Russia, and the EU—on strategic issues ranging from non-traditional security threats to maritime governance. France’s enhanced partnership would not only fortify ASEAN’s resilience but also rebalance the forum’s dynamics by adding a European voice that is deeply embedded in the Indo-Pacific.

Sceptics may argue that France’s geopolitical reach is overstated or that ASEAN’s internal cohesion is too fragile to absorb another major external partner. But these are precisely the reasons to act now. By granting France Comprehensive Strategic Partner status, ASEAN strengthens its diplomatic toolkit and diversifies its strategic partnerships beyond the binary great power rivalry. For France, it is an opportunity to institutionalize its commitment to Southeast Asia, not just through military gestures or presidential visits, but via formal mechanisms of dialogue, cooperation, and mutual respect.

Furthermore, as ASEAN explores the creation of minilateral coalitions and flexible institutional linkages—through the ASEAN Maritime Outlook, the ASEAN Digital Economic Framework Agreement (DEFA), and the Asia Zero Emissions Community (AZEC)—France's participation can be transformative. AZEC is poised to have a summit in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia in late September 2025, and Malaysia as the Group Chair of ASEAN would be the Co Host too. There is synergy on all France and not necessarily exclusion of China although China would in due course have to consider how to join AZEC.

Anwar's move would allow ASEAN to triangulate its relations with Europe and the Indo-Pacific without being entrapped in zero-sum geopolitical games.

Anwar Ibrahim’s diplomacy with France is, thus, not episodic but structural. It reflects a long-term rethinking of Malaysia’s role as a bridge-builder and convener within ASEAN. It also underscores Malaysia’s capacity to bring underappreciated actors—such as France—into the mainstream of Southeast Asia’s strategic thinking. If France’s Indo-Pacific strategy is to be credible, it must go through ASEAN. And if ASEAN is to mature into a truly global regional actor, it must embrace partners like France with full strategic recognition.

In sum, a strategic pivot to Paris is not merely bilateral diplomacy—it is regional statecraft. It is ASEAN thinking beyond continental confines and into the vast maritime domains that define the future of global politics. France’s elevation to Comprehensive Strategic Partner status is not a leap—it is a long overdue alignment. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is simply the first to see it—and act. Others in ASEAN should follow.

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Phar Kim Beng is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and a former Head Teaching Fellow at Harvard University.