INTERNATIONAL
The strategic value, pressure of the Straits of Malacca have shot up after closure of Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is closed, and the world is recalibrating. But in this recalibration, the Strait of Malacca cannot afford to falter, says Phar Kim Beng
The recent closure of the Strait of Hormuz — following Iranian retaliation against joint U.S. and Israeli strikes on its nuclear facilities — has profoundly altered the geometry of global maritime security. While the Persian Gulf region reels from geopolitical upheaval, it is the Strait of Malacca thousands of kilometres away that has quietly assumed an outsized role in the strategic calculus of both Washington and Beijing.
With the Hormuz choke point now effectively impassable due to a combination of naval blockades, drone swarms, and missile threats, energy and cargo shipments from the Middle East and beyond are being rerouted through longer and riskier journeys. The Strait of Malacca — a narrow, congested waterway linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea — is now absorbing a massive surge in maritime traffic.
In the wake of the closure, shipping patterns have shifted rapidly, insurance costs have surged, and most critically, the pressure on Malacca’s security and stability has increased exponentially. Where once the Strait of Malacca was a vital artery, it is now the primary maritime lifeline for East Asia. With oil prices spiking, the world’s major powers have turned their attention squarely to Southeast Asia’s most strategic corridor.
The Malacca Strait as a Global Choke Point
Over 100,000 vessels pass through the Strait of Malacca annually, carrying energy, electronics, semiconductors, manufactured goods, and rare earths. It is the second most trafficked sea lane in the world — behind only the English Channel — and serves as the main conduit for global trade flowing between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Now, with Hormuz no longer viable, China, Japan, South Korea, and India must rely almost entirely on Malacca for incoming shipments from Africa, Latin America, and the wider Indian Ocean. The sudden escalation in dependence has thrown Malacca into the cross hairs of both opportunity and vulnerability.
The Strait’s navigable channel — in some stretches just 1.7 miles wide — now carries more geopolitical tension than ever before. The likelihood of congestion, miscommunication, and even military provocation has increased dramatically.
China’s Renewed Anxiety: The “Malacca Dilemma” Returns
The “Malacca Dilemma”, long a concern of Chinese strategic thinkers, has now fully returned. Originally articulated by then-President Hu Jintao in 2003, it reflected Beijing’s fear that its economic lifeline could be severed at the whim of a foreign navy. Despite years of investment in overland pipelines, ports in Pakistan and Myanmar, and ambitions for a Kra Canal through Thailand, over 80% of China’s imported energy and goods still pass through Malacca.
With Hormuz blocked, China has no choice but to reinforce its naval and maritime presence in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has begun deploying more escort missions, expanding its logistics networks, and ramping up bilateral maritime exercises — from Pakistan’s Gwadar Port to the Indonesian archipelago.
China’s concern is not just the volume of trade but the vulnerability of its energy flows, its Belt and Road infrastructure, and the risk of entrapment by U.S. naval superiority in the Indo-Pacific.
The U.S. Maritime Playbook: Freedom of Navigation or Strategic Leverage?
For the United States, Malacca has long been a critical artery under the security umbrella of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In the current crisis, its importance has soared. The Pentagon sees the Strait not merely as a commercial passage but as a strategic lever — especially in any scenario involving Taiwan or South China Sea tensions.
With Hormuz shut, U.S. aircraft carriers and guided missile destroyers are transiting through Malacca in greater numbers. Surveillance flights have increased. Naval port calls to Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines are occurring with greater frequency.
U.S. officials are pressing for expanded logistics hubs, rotational basing rights, and joint maritime exercises under the guise of maintaining a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”
Yet this region has its own ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) which Beijing can accept too due to its sober language. And non-confrontational thrust adopted by member states of ASEAN in 2019.
Thus, while China accepts AOIP, it sees other versions of Indo Pacific strategies as an effort to box it in — transforming the narrow waters of Malacca into a geopolitical vice. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia must take AOIP seriously. Not other versions of Indo Pacific strategies.
With both powers i.e. China and the US increasing their maritime footprint, the likelihood of operational friction is rising.
ASEAN’s Strategic Geography: A Blessing and a Burden
Caught in the middle of this high-stakes maritime rivalry are the ASEAN littoral states: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. These countries are the custodians of the Strait of Malacca, but with the closure of Hormuz, their geographic significance has taken on a new and more precarious form.
Singapore, with its sophisticated port infrastructure and U.S. logistics access, remains a linchpin in regional maritime stability.
Malaysia, under the proactive diplomacy of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, is walking a tightrope — advocating de-escalation while trying to prevent excessive militarization of ASEAN waters.
Indonesia, wary of any encroachments on its maritime sovereignty, has stepped up patrols in the Natuna Sea and called for restraint from all external powers.
ASEAN has traditionally pursued a posture of strategic equidistance between the U.S. and China. But the closing of Hormuz has disrupted this careful balance. Both Washington and Beijing now expect greater alignment, if not overt support.
Avoiding Over-Militarisation: A New Maritime Code?
The rapid militarisation of the Strait risks undermining the very stability it seeks to secure.
With multiple navies navigating the same waters, the chances of accidental escalation are growing. ASEAN must urgently consider a Maritime Code of Conduct for Critical Sea Lanes, one that draws from the Helsinki Process in Europe in 1972-1975 and emphasizes:
1. Transparency of military movements
2. Non-interference in commercial shipping
3. Joint emergency protocols
4. Environmental and humanitarian safeguards
Malaysia, as Group Chair of ASEAN and Related Summits in 2025, has a unique opportunity to lead this initiative — ensuring the Strait of Malacca remains a space for cooperation, not confrontation.
A Wake-Up Call for ASEAN
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has functioned as a geostrategic shockwave — exposing the fragility of maritime dependencies and the urgency of securing alternate corridors. But it has also spotlighted ASEAN’s centrality. The region is no longer peripheral. It is pivotal.
Yet this newfound importance comes with responsibility. ASEAN must now speak with one voice — not only in defending the openness of the Malacca Strait, but also in charting a long-term vision for regional maritime governance.
Conclusion: Hormuz Closed, Malacca Cannot Fail
The Strait of Hormuz is closed, and the world is recalibrating. But in this recalibration, the Strait of Malacca cannot afford to falter. It must remain open, secure, and neutral — not just for ASEAN, but for the global commons.
What happens in Malacca in the coming months will shape not just regional diplomacy, but the very future of maritime Asia.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and a Cambridge Commonwealth Fellow.
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.
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With the Hormuz choke point now effectively impassable due to a combination of naval blockades, drone swarms, and missile threats, energy and cargo shipments from the Middle East and beyond are being rerouted through longer and riskier journeys. The Strait of Malacca — a narrow, congested waterway linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea — is now absorbing a massive surge in maritime traffic.
In the wake of the closure, shipping patterns have shifted rapidly, insurance costs have surged, and most critically, the pressure on Malacca’s security and stability has increased exponentially. Where once the Strait of Malacca was a vital artery, it is now the primary maritime lifeline for East Asia. With oil prices spiking, the world’s major powers have turned their attention squarely to Southeast Asia’s most strategic corridor.
The Malacca Strait as a Global Choke Point
Over 100,000 vessels pass through the Strait of Malacca annually, carrying energy, electronics, semiconductors, manufactured goods, and rare earths. It is the second most trafficked sea lane in the world — behind only the English Channel — and serves as the main conduit for global trade flowing between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Now, with Hormuz no longer viable, China, Japan, South Korea, and India must rely almost entirely on Malacca for incoming shipments from Africa, Latin America, and the wider Indian Ocean. The sudden escalation in dependence has thrown Malacca into the cross hairs of both opportunity and vulnerability.
The Strait’s navigable channel — in some stretches just 1.7 miles wide — now carries more geopolitical tension than ever before. The likelihood of congestion, miscommunication, and even military provocation has increased dramatically.
China’s Renewed Anxiety: The “Malacca Dilemma” Returns
The “Malacca Dilemma”, long a concern of Chinese strategic thinkers, has now fully returned. Originally articulated by then-President Hu Jintao in 2003, it reflected Beijing’s fear that its economic lifeline could be severed at the whim of a foreign navy. Despite years of investment in overland pipelines, ports in Pakistan and Myanmar, and ambitions for a Kra Canal through Thailand, over 80% of China’s imported energy and goods still pass through Malacca.
With Hormuz blocked, China has no choice but to reinforce its naval and maritime presence in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has begun deploying more escort missions, expanding its logistics networks, and ramping up bilateral maritime exercises — from Pakistan’s Gwadar Port to the Indonesian archipelago.
China’s concern is not just the volume of trade but the vulnerability of its energy flows, its Belt and Road infrastructure, and the risk of entrapment by U.S. naval superiority in the Indo-Pacific.
The U.S. Maritime Playbook: Freedom of Navigation or Strategic Leverage?
For the United States, Malacca has long been a critical artery under the security umbrella of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In the current crisis, its importance has soared. The Pentagon sees the Strait not merely as a commercial passage but as a strategic lever — especially in any scenario involving Taiwan or South China Sea tensions.
With Hormuz shut, U.S. aircraft carriers and guided missile destroyers are transiting through Malacca in greater numbers. Surveillance flights have increased. Naval port calls to Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines are occurring with greater frequency.
U.S. officials are pressing for expanded logistics hubs, rotational basing rights, and joint maritime exercises under the guise of maintaining a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”
Yet this region has its own ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) which Beijing can accept too due to its sober language. And non-confrontational thrust adopted by member states of ASEAN in 2019.
Thus, while China accepts AOIP, it sees other versions of Indo Pacific strategies as an effort to box it in — transforming the narrow waters of Malacca into a geopolitical vice. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia must take AOIP seriously. Not other versions of Indo Pacific strategies.
With both powers i.e. China and the US increasing their maritime footprint, the likelihood of operational friction is rising.
ASEAN’s Strategic Geography: A Blessing and a Burden
Caught in the middle of this high-stakes maritime rivalry are the ASEAN littoral states: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. These countries are the custodians of the Strait of Malacca, but with the closure of Hormuz, their geographic significance has taken on a new and more precarious form.
Singapore, with its sophisticated port infrastructure and U.S. logistics access, remains a linchpin in regional maritime stability.
Malaysia, under the proactive diplomacy of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, is walking a tightrope — advocating de-escalation while trying to prevent excessive militarization of ASEAN waters.
Indonesia, wary of any encroachments on its maritime sovereignty, has stepped up patrols in the Natuna Sea and called for restraint from all external powers.
ASEAN has traditionally pursued a posture of strategic equidistance between the U.S. and China. But the closing of Hormuz has disrupted this careful balance. Both Washington and Beijing now expect greater alignment, if not overt support.
Avoiding Over-Militarisation: A New Maritime Code?
The rapid militarisation of the Strait risks undermining the very stability it seeks to secure.
With multiple navies navigating the same waters, the chances of accidental escalation are growing. ASEAN must urgently consider a Maritime Code of Conduct for Critical Sea Lanes, one that draws from the Helsinki Process in Europe in 1972-1975 and emphasizes:
1. Transparency of military movements
2. Non-interference in commercial shipping
3. Joint emergency protocols
4. Environmental and humanitarian safeguards
Malaysia, as Group Chair of ASEAN and Related Summits in 2025, has a unique opportunity to lead this initiative — ensuring the Strait of Malacca remains a space for cooperation, not confrontation.
A Wake-Up Call for ASEAN
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has functioned as a geostrategic shockwave — exposing the fragility of maritime dependencies and the urgency of securing alternate corridors. But it has also spotlighted ASEAN’s centrality. The region is no longer peripheral. It is pivotal.
Yet this newfound importance comes with responsibility. ASEAN must now speak with one voice — not only in defending the openness of the Malacca Strait, but also in charting a long-term vision for regional maritime governance.
Conclusion: Hormuz Closed, Malacca Cannot Fail
The Strait of Hormuz is closed, and the world is recalibrating. But in this recalibration, the Strait of Malacca cannot afford to falter. It must remain open, secure, and neutral — not just for ASEAN, but for the global commons.
What happens in Malacca in the coming months will shape not just regional diplomacy, but the very future of maritime Asia.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and a Cambridge Commonwealth Fellow.
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.
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