INTERNATIONAL
System integration in modern warfare
Venezuela's swift loss highlights that integration, not isolated hardware, defines modern warfare and offers lessons for Malaysia. - REUTERS/Filepic
ON 3rd of Jan 2026, U.S. forces carried out one of the most highly coordinated and complicated operation that stunned military observers around the world.
Venezuela, long regarded to have ‘the most formidable air-defence networks in South America’, was unable to respond effectively as multiple U.S. military assets operated in concert to capture the president.
Within three hours, the mission was accomplished with minimal casualties, and the Venezuelan air-defence systems barely returned fire. This episode was not only a demonstration of superiority in firepower, but a stark reminder that modern military dominance lies in integration, coordination and information superiority among all different forces.
This operation reminding military strategic analysts of modern contemporary warfare: conflict operations no longer depend on individual platforms or headline-grabbing weapons. Instead, the integration of surveillance, communications, command systems, air, sea and land assets which play the anchor role. In addition, increasingly space- and cyber-based capabilities, such as electromagnetic dominance, cyber operations, woven into a coherent system.
Even a country equipped with advanced standalone defences, those systems can be isolated, poorly integrated or unable to respond cohesively under pressure, and even poor command link and authority can make the situation worse – That’s exactly what happened in Venezuela!
Venezuelan air defence system mainly comprising of long-range S-300VM, medium-range Bulk-M2, and thousands of short-range Igla-S shoulder-launched Man Portable Air-Defence System (MANPADS). These systems are supported by carious radar systems from Russia and China.
All these systems have shown their incompetency in front of the world!
This reality should shape how nations think about military procurement.
Modern conflict is no longer a contest between armies, navies and air forces operating in parallel, but a competition among all systems. The lesson from Venezuelan is deadly: buying capable platforms is not enough!
What matters is communication, data sharing and integrated action between platforms. The combined effect is exponential—one plus one becomes more than two.
Other than Venezuela, Thailand also provides another useful illustration. The use of Erieye Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) alongside Gripen and F-16 fighters demonstrates how integration multiplies combat effectiveness. With Thai tactical Data Link (Link-TH) that ensure smooth and accurate command decision, fighters have increasing situational awareness and able to carry out air patrol and ground strike respectively. None of these platforms can operating alone and effective as they are when networked together. The strength lies not in any single aircraft, but in the system they form.
Even in the Pakistan-India conflict back in May 2025, Pakistani’s Chinese-made J-10CE surprisingly down Indian’s French-made Rafale, thanks to the Data Link 17, developed by Pakistan, connecting both Chinese military hardware with Swedish-made AWACS.
From the examples above, the decisive factor is integration—who can sense first, decide faster and act precisely.
This is a lesson Malaysia should take seriously.
First of all, these three different scales and natures of conflicts show AWACS prevails in modern conflict.
Historically, Malaysia’s defence procurement strategy has been influenced not only by operational requirements, but also by diplomatic balance and international political considerations. As a result, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) operating equipment sourced from a wide range of countries. While this approach may have made sense from a foreign policy perspective, it has imposed long-term operational costs and platform integration issues.
A mixed-origin fleet creating endless issues: complex maintenance chains, incompatible data links, fragmented training pipelines and limited interoperability between platforms. Assets that cannot communicate seamlessly with one another struggle to operate as an integrated force, resulting in low operational efficiency and high lifecycle costs.
The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Malaysia Air Force (RMAF) illustrate this dilemma explicitly.
RMN vessels were acquired from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, China…...
These vessels operating with different combat systems, logistics requirements and support ecosystems. The recent decision to procure additional vessels from yet another supplier risks compounding the same problem. Without a strong integration strategy, these vessels only have fragmented capability.
While RMAF operating fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft from U.S., Russia, UK and etc.
However, this does not mean Malaysia must have military hardware from a single foreign partner or abandon strategic autonomy completely.
Rather, the procurement decisions should be guided by a clear systems architecture, from strategic use and tactical use of the platform. How the platforms communicate? how data flows? how joint operations, training and maintenance can be conducted and streamlined.
The question should be “How does this platform fit into the overall system and perform as a system?”
Malaysia is a small country but still need to prepare for unexpected conflict. As defence budgets is limited, it shall be spent in a way that efficiency matters as much as capability. A smaller number of well-integrated platforms can outperform a large number of unconnected hardware.
Purchasing of second-hand assets may be cheap. But can these assets fit into current system? If not, how much we shall spend to refitting the system?
In overall, well-connected and integrated system provide decision-makers with flexibility, resilience and credibility in an increasingly complex security environment.
Hence, modern defence is not about buying eyeball-catching weapons; it is about building systems. If the Malaysia government wishes to maximise the return on its defence spending and high operational effectiveness, it is time to rethink and restructure procurement through the lens of integration. That will be the best for the nation.
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, Professor of ASEAN Studies, Director of Institute of International and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS), International Islamic University of Malaysia
Jitkai Chin, PhD PEng, Department of Chemical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi Petronas, also expert committee member in Centre of Strategic Regional Studies (CROSS)
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.
Your gateway to global news, insights, and stories that matter.
Venezuela, long regarded to have ‘the most formidable air-defence networks in South America’, was unable to respond effectively as multiple U.S. military assets operated in concert to capture the president.
Within three hours, the mission was accomplished with minimal casualties, and the Venezuelan air-defence systems barely returned fire. This episode was not only a demonstration of superiority in firepower, but a stark reminder that modern military dominance lies in integration, coordination and information superiority among all different forces.
This operation reminding military strategic analysts of modern contemporary warfare: conflict operations no longer depend on individual platforms or headline-grabbing weapons. Instead, the integration of surveillance, communications, command systems, air, sea and land assets which play the anchor role. In addition, increasingly space- and cyber-based capabilities, such as electromagnetic dominance, cyber operations, woven into a coherent system.
Even a country equipped with advanced standalone defences, those systems can be isolated, poorly integrated or unable to respond cohesively under pressure, and even poor command link and authority can make the situation worse – That’s exactly what happened in Venezuela!
Venezuelan air defence system mainly comprising of long-range S-300VM, medium-range Bulk-M2, and thousands of short-range Igla-S shoulder-launched Man Portable Air-Defence System (MANPADS). These systems are supported by carious radar systems from Russia and China.
All these systems have shown their incompetency in front of the world!
This reality should shape how nations think about military procurement.
Modern conflict is no longer a contest between armies, navies and air forces operating in parallel, but a competition among all systems. The lesson from Venezuelan is deadly: buying capable platforms is not enough!
What matters is communication, data sharing and integrated action between platforms. The combined effect is exponential—one plus one becomes more than two.
Other than Venezuela, Thailand also provides another useful illustration. The use of Erieye Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) alongside Gripen and F-16 fighters demonstrates how integration multiplies combat effectiveness. With Thai tactical Data Link (Link-TH) that ensure smooth and accurate command decision, fighters have increasing situational awareness and able to carry out air patrol and ground strike respectively. None of these platforms can operating alone and effective as they are when networked together. The strength lies not in any single aircraft, but in the system they form.
Even in the Pakistan-India conflict back in May 2025, Pakistani’s Chinese-made J-10CE surprisingly down Indian’s French-made Rafale, thanks to the Data Link 17, developed by Pakistan, connecting both Chinese military hardware with Swedish-made AWACS.
From the examples above, the decisive factor is integration—who can sense first, decide faster and act precisely.
This is a lesson Malaysia should take seriously.
First of all, these three different scales and natures of conflicts show AWACS prevails in modern conflict.
Historically, Malaysia’s defence procurement strategy has been influenced not only by operational requirements, but also by diplomatic balance and international political considerations. As a result, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) operating equipment sourced from a wide range of countries. While this approach may have made sense from a foreign policy perspective, it has imposed long-term operational costs and platform integration issues.
A mixed-origin fleet creating endless issues: complex maintenance chains, incompatible data links, fragmented training pipelines and limited interoperability between platforms. Assets that cannot communicate seamlessly with one another struggle to operate as an integrated force, resulting in low operational efficiency and high lifecycle costs.
The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Malaysia Air Force (RMAF) illustrate this dilemma explicitly.
RMN vessels were acquired from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, China…...
These vessels operating with different combat systems, logistics requirements and support ecosystems. The recent decision to procure additional vessels from yet another supplier risks compounding the same problem. Without a strong integration strategy, these vessels only have fragmented capability.
While RMAF operating fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft from U.S., Russia, UK and etc.
However, this does not mean Malaysia must have military hardware from a single foreign partner or abandon strategic autonomy completely.
Rather, the procurement decisions should be guided by a clear systems architecture, from strategic use and tactical use of the platform. How the platforms communicate? how data flows? how joint operations, training and maintenance can be conducted and streamlined.
The question should be “How does this platform fit into the overall system and perform as a system?”
Malaysia is a small country but still need to prepare for unexpected conflict. As defence budgets is limited, it shall be spent in a way that efficiency matters as much as capability. A smaller number of well-integrated platforms can outperform a large number of unconnected hardware.
Purchasing of second-hand assets may be cheap. But can these assets fit into current system? If not, how much we shall spend to refitting the system?
In overall, well-connected and integrated system provide decision-makers with flexibility, resilience and credibility in an increasingly complex security environment.
Hence, modern defence is not about buying eyeball-catching weapons; it is about building systems. If the Malaysia government wishes to maximise the return on its defence spending and high operational effectiveness, it is time to rethink and restructure procurement through the lens of integration. That will be the best for the nation.
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, Professor of ASEAN Studies, Director of Institute of International and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS), International Islamic University of Malaysia
Jitkai Chin, PhD PEng, Department of Chemical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi Petronas, also expert committee member in Centre of Strategic Regional Studies (CROSS)
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.
Your gateway to global news, insights, and stories that matter.