Time for ASEANAPOL to step up with policing the region

ASEANAPOL, or the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police organization, has existed since 1981. While its institutional roots are not new, its political visibility and operational effectiveness remain strikingly low. Despite admirable initiatives to build trust and cooperation among member police forces, ASEANAPOL today functions more like a forum of annual goodwill rather than a permanent, proactive apparatus for managing regional law enforcement challenges.

This inertia must change.

The modern threats facing Southeast Asia are not conventional military invasions but transnational and hybrid in nature. Human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, terrorism, illegal fishing, and cybercrime are increasingly conducted by sophisticated, tech-savvy networks that exploit the gaps in ASEAN’s cross-border policing. The same criminal groups that move drugs from the Golden Triangle can also facilitate illegal migration, engage in money laundering, or participate in digital fraud operations.

The Mekong region, for instance, has seen trans boundary crime surging in recent years. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that synthetic drug seizures in Southeast Asia reached record highs in 2023, with methamphetamine trafficking remaining rampant. The perpetrators routinely cross borders, often exploiting jurisdictions that lack real-time data sharing or standardized procedures.

In the maritime domain, illegal fishing and piracy persist, while maritime smuggling routes are used to move people and weapons undetected.

These are not problems that any one ASEAN country can address alone. Not even the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) or the Malaysian Border Control Agency (MBCA) since their arrest of any perpetrators lack the right of investigation and enforcement.

Yet the longer ASEANAPOL remains a backbencher, not backed with proper missions and mandates to police certain areas susceptible to regular illegal contraband or low-level insurgency the likelihood of ASEAN Power Grid and ASEAN Railway Network would be significantly slowed.

ASEAN’s proud tradition of consensus-based diplomacy has unfortunately led to paralysis in operationalising many institutions. ASEANAPOL, in this regard, reflects the limitations of ASEAN’s institutional imagination. Instead of operating as a regional police force with a standing secretariat, shared databases, and rapid response mechanisms, it largely serves as a venue for discussions between police chiefs.

To be fair, ASEANAPOL has undertaken steps toward information sharing through the e-ADS (electronic ASEANAPOL Database System), which aims to store criminal records, fingerprints, and data on transnational criminals. But participation is voluntary and inconsistent. Unlike INTERPOL, ASEANAPOL has no legal mandate or capacity to issue notices, no central command structure, and no visibility in the public discourse of regional security.

If ASEAN can envision regional frameworks like the ASEAN Single Window in trade, or the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity, why not a fully integrated ASEANAPOL Coordination Centre, based in Jakarta, Manila, or Kuala Lumpur, that operates 24/7 with permanent liaison officers from each member state?

ASEAN has long championed regionalism that is “people centred.” But how can this slogan ring true when everyday Southeast Asians are the ones most vulnerable to crimes that transcend borders—and there is no agile, regional policing body to protect them?

ASEANAPOL must also reckon with the increasing footprint of extra-regional security actors in Southeast Asia. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), AUKUS, and growing bilateral defence ties between the U.S., China, and ASEAN states show that Southeast Asia is becoming more entangled in great power competition. In this climate, it is more urgent than ever for ASEAN to present a unified front—not only in traditional defence, but also in internal and civil security.

Policing is no longer just about catching criminals—it is about building societal resilience against disinformation, cyber manipulation, extremist ideologies, and covert influence operations. ASEANAPOL should play a critical role in countering hybrid threats that often start in the digital domain but spill into real-life harm.

The rise of authoritarian digital tools in the region—facial recognition, surveillance software, and AI-based profiling—also underscores the need for ASEAN to have a normative framework to prevent abuse. ASEANAPOL can help standardize regional policing ethics and codes of conduct, ensuring that security does not come at the expense of civil liberties.

ASEAN must provide ASEANPOL with a clear political mandate. This does not mean creating an ASEAN version of the FBI or EUROPOL overnight. But it does mean transforming ASEANPOL from a soft coordination platform to a hard operational hub.

One model to consider is the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), which, though it cannot make arrests, supports member states with analysis, intelligence coordination, and joint investigations. Even a minimalist ASEANAPOL version of EUROPOL would be a monumental leap forward.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, as Chair of ASEAN in 2025–2026, can and should initiate this institutional reform. With Timor-Leste joining ASEAN, and regional digitalization accelerating, ASEANAPOL must be brought out of obscurity and into the limelight of ASEAN’s regional architecture.

It is time for ASEANAPOL to evolve—not just to catch up with criminal syndicates, but to get ahead of them.

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Phar Kim Beng is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and was formerly the Head Teaching Fellow at Harvard University and a Cambridge Commonwealth Scholar.