INTERNATIONAL
Understanding ASEAN’s Chairmanship in conflict: Past, present and future must act together on Thai-Cambodian war
ASEAN activates its Troika diplomacy as Thai-Cambodian border crisis tests regional unity and calls for reform in conflict response. - asean.org/Filepic
The war-like escalation between Thailand and Cambodia along their contested border has caught many observers off guard. In a region long praised for avoiding inter-state warfare since the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, this eruption is jarring. But to frame this as a failure of ASEAN is to misunderstand the underlying architecture of its diplomacy and chairmanship responsibilities. The system, while often understated, is quietly working behind the scenes—and it requires greater understanding from critics, media analysts, and international commentators alike.
AI Brief
At the core of ASEAN’s diplomacy lies a principle that may appear informal to outsiders but is in fact a fundamental logic of its conflict prevention mechanism: the Troika of the past, current, and future Chairs of ASEAN. In this instance, that means Laos (2024), Malaysia (2025), and the Philippines (2026). These three countries are not only symbolically linked by their rotation but are expected to coordinate their diplomatic capabilities to collectively respond to crises—particularly in sudden eruptions like the current Thai Cambodian border hostilities.
The idea is simple but effective: when crisis strikes, no single state is burdened to bear the entire regional responsibility. Instead, the Troika ensures continuity, historical memory, and future commitment. The current Chair, Malaysia, led by Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, is of course in the driver's seat. But it is Laos—still familiar with sensitive regional dossiers from its chairmanship—and the Philippines, poised to take up the mantle in just five months, that must also engage urgently. The ASEAN Troika, when activated properly, becomes a microcosm of collective regional will. It is not a panacea, but a process—and one deeply rooted in consensus, patience, and calibrated diplomacy.
Those unfamiliar with ASEAN may scoff at this layered structure as sluggish or indecisive. But that is a misdiagnosis. ASEAN has long been a bastion against external interference precisely because of its internal cohesion. Critics often overlook the fact that while ASEAN may flail in moments of stress—like now—it rarely fails. And when it does flail, it does so in full recognition of its principles: non-intervention, mutual respect, and peaceful settlement of disputes. These principles are not excuses for inaction but preconditions for stability.
The current eruption between Thailand and Cambodia—triggered by overlapping claims and deepened by ancient cartographic ambiguities left behind by colonial masters—is a textbook case of how historical grievances can resurface violently. Indeed, the Emerald Triangle, long touted as a symbol of biodiversity and cultural interflow, has tragically become the epicentre of bombings, artillery exchanges, and civilian displacement.
But it is precisely because this situation is so volatile and so unprecedented that ASEAN’s unique approach to diplomacy must be preserved—and reinforced.
Both China and the United States, ASEAN’s Comprehensive Strategic Partners, have not taken sides. They seek, above all, stability. This is a key indicator that ASEAN’s foundational purpose—creating a neutral regional zone free of Cold War-era proxy manipulation—is still largely intact. Neither Beijing nor Washington wants this border war to drag on, nor to be seen as exacerbating it. The absence of major power interference is not a vacuum; it is a validation of ASEAN centrality in practice.
Malaysia, under Anwar Ibrahim’s chairmanship, has positioned itself wisely. Anwar has described the global moment as “post-normal”—where traditional expectations of state behaviour collapse under the weight of unexpected upheavals. ASEAN’s own presumed normalcy—of being crisis-free—is now under strain. But Anwar’s strategic reading is clear: this does not mark the breakdown of ASEAN, but a call to reform its diplomatic agility.
Indeed, Anwar and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto have already begun coordinating responses, reflecting an instinctive understanding between the two leaders that stability in mainland Southeast Asia cannot be taken for granted. As two founding members of ASEAN, Malaysia and Indonesia carry both historical responsibility and moral weight. Their coordination matters immensely.
The idea of deploying a ministerial-level Troika should not be dismissed as cosmetic. It has historical precedent. During past crises, such as the Timor-Leste ascension talks or the Rohingya humanitarian emergency, it was these trilateral mechanisms that kept ASEAN’s internal temperature balanced and its reputation from imploding. More importantly, they show that diplomacy in ASEAN is never dormant—even when quiet.
ASEAN’s strength has always been its ability to restrain great power rivalry and prevent local disputes from becoming geopolitical quagmires. That no major power has taken sides in this border war is a quiet diplomatic success. It allows the region to focus on immediate humanitarian needs—especially in the bombed-out districts of the Emerald Triangle—without the distraction of ideological battles between East and West.
Of course, ASEAN must do more. It must criminalize the underground economies and illicit syndicates that have turned the border regions into grey zones of digital scamming, slave labour, and narcotics. These shadowy networks not only fund local warlords but also erode state sovereignty from within. If ASEAN fails to address these root causes, military conflicts will continue to flare, and diplomacy will be stretched thin.
ASEAN must also expand its early warning systems, leverage Track 1.5 dialogues, and ensure that the ASEAN Secretariat—not just the rotating Chair—has institutional depth to support preventive diplomacy. But none of this can replace the political will of leaders who understand the importance of peace above pride, process over provocation.
As Prime Minister Anwar prepares for yet another round of shuttle diplomacy—possibly involving his counterparts from Manila and Vientiane—the world should resist the temptation to prematurely declare ASEAN obsolete. Yes, it is flailing in this crisis. But flailing is not failure. It is movement. It is the prelude to stabilization.
Let us not forget: ASEAN was built precisely to weather storms like these. A storm it never wanted. But one it is uniquely equipped to calm—if only its mechanisms are activated, understood, and respected.
In the months ahead, all eyes will remain on the Thai Cambodian border. But equal attention must be paid to what happens in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Manila, and Vientiane. This is not just a test of bilateral diplomacy—it is ASEAN’s hour of reckoning. And perhaps, if properly stewarded, its finest hour.
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies and Director of the Institute of Internationaliation and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS) at the International Islamic University Malaysia.
Luthfy Hamzah is Senior Research Fellow at IINTAS and a specialist in trade, political economy, and strategic diplomacy in Northeast Asia.
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.
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AI Brief
- Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines form ASEAN's Troika to coordinate crisis response and ensure continuity in regional diplomacy.
- Despite criticism, ASEAN's non-intervention and consensus-based approach helps prevent external interference and escalation.
- Leaders like Anwar Ibrahim urge stronger diplomatic agility and deeper institutional support to manage future regional conflicts.
At the core of ASEAN’s diplomacy lies a principle that may appear informal to outsiders but is in fact a fundamental logic of its conflict prevention mechanism: the Troika of the past, current, and future Chairs of ASEAN. In this instance, that means Laos (2024), Malaysia (2025), and the Philippines (2026). These three countries are not only symbolically linked by their rotation but are expected to coordinate their diplomatic capabilities to collectively respond to crises—particularly in sudden eruptions like the current Thai Cambodian border hostilities.
The idea is simple but effective: when crisis strikes, no single state is burdened to bear the entire regional responsibility. Instead, the Troika ensures continuity, historical memory, and future commitment. The current Chair, Malaysia, led by Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, is of course in the driver's seat. But it is Laos—still familiar with sensitive regional dossiers from its chairmanship—and the Philippines, poised to take up the mantle in just five months, that must also engage urgently. The ASEAN Troika, when activated properly, becomes a microcosm of collective regional will. It is not a panacea, but a process—and one deeply rooted in consensus, patience, and calibrated diplomacy.
Those unfamiliar with ASEAN may scoff at this layered structure as sluggish or indecisive. But that is a misdiagnosis. ASEAN has long been a bastion against external interference precisely because of its internal cohesion. Critics often overlook the fact that while ASEAN may flail in moments of stress—like now—it rarely fails. And when it does flail, it does so in full recognition of its principles: non-intervention, mutual respect, and peaceful settlement of disputes. These principles are not excuses for inaction but preconditions for stability.
The current eruption between Thailand and Cambodia—triggered by overlapping claims and deepened by ancient cartographic ambiguities left behind by colonial masters—is a textbook case of how historical grievances can resurface violently. Indeed, the Emerald Triangle, long touted as a symbol of biodiversity and cultural interflow, has tragically become the epicentre of bombings, artillery exchanges, and civilian displacement.
But it is precisely because this situation is so volatile and so unprecedented that ASEAN’s unique approach to diplomacy must be preserved—and reinforced.
Both China and the United States, ASEAN’s Comprehensive Strategic Partners, have not taken sides. They seek, above all, stability. This is a key indicator that ASEAN’s foundational purpose—creating a neutral regional zone free of Cold War-era proxy manipulation—is still largely intact. Neither Beijing nor Washington wants this border war to drag on, nor to be seen as exacerbating it. The absence of major power interference is not a vacuum; it is a validation of ASEAN centrality in practice.
Malaysia, under Anwar Ibrahim’s chairmanship, has positioned itself wisely. Anwar has described the global moment as “post-normal”—where traditional expectations of state behaviour collapse under the weight of unexpected upheavals. ASEAN’s own presumed normalcy—of being crisis-free—is now under strain. But Anwar’s strategic reading is clear: this does not mark the breakdown of ASEAN, but a call to reform its diplomatic agility.
Indeed, Anwar and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto have already begun coordinating responses, reflecting an instinctive understanding between the two leaders that stability in mainland Southeast Asia cannot be taken for granted. As two founding members of ASEAN, Malaysia and Indonesia carry both historical responsibility and moral weight. Their coordination matters immensely.
The idea of deploying a ministerial-level Troika should not be dismissed as cosmetic. It has historical precedent. During past crises, such as the Timor-Leste ascension talks or the Rohingya humanitarian emergency, it was these trilateral mechanisms that kept ASEAN’s internal temperature balanced and its reputation from imploding. More importantly, they show that diplomacy in ASEAN is never dormant—even when quiet.
ASEAN’s strength has always been its ability to restrain great power rivalry and prevent local disputes from becoming geopolitical quagmires. That no major power has taken sides in this border war is a quiet diplomatic success. It allows the region to focus on immediate humanitarian needs—especially in the bombed-out districts of the Emerald Triangle—without the distraction of ideological battles between East and West.
Of course, ASEAN must do more. It must criminalize the underground economies and illicit syndicates that have turned the border regions into grey zones of digital scamming, slave labour, and narcotics. These shadowy networks not only fund local warlords but also erode state sovereignty from within. If ASEAN fails to address these root causes, military conflicts will continue to flare, and diplomacy will be stretched thin.
ASEAN must also expand its early warning systems, leverage Track 1.5 dialogues, and ensure that the ASEAN Secretariat—not just the rotating Chair—has institutional depth to support preventive diplomacy. But none of this can replace the political will of leaders who understand the importance of peace above pride, process over provocation.
As Prime Minister Anwar prepares for yet another round of shuttle diplomacy—possibly involving his counterparts from Manila and Vientiane—the world should resist the temptation to prematurely declare ASEAN obsolete. Yes, it is flailing in this crisis. But flailing is not failure. It is movement. It is the prelude to stabilization.
Let us not forget: ASEAN was built precisely to weather storms like these. A storm it never wanted. But one it is uniquely equipped to calm—if only its mechanisms are activated, understood, and respected.
In the months ahead, all eyes will remain on the Thai Cambodian border. But equal attention must be paid to what happens in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Manila, and Vientiane. This is not just a test of bilateral diplomacy—it is ASEAN’s hour of reckoning. And perhaps, if properly stewarded, its finest hour.
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies and Director of the Institute of Internationaliation and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS) at the International Islamic University Malaysia.
Luthfy Hamzah is Senior Research Fellow at IINTAS and a specialist in trade, political economy, and strategic diplomacy in Northeast Asia.
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.