INTERNATIONAL
The US overestimates China's influence on Iran, especially on the Straits of Hormuz
Iran’s call to close the Strait of Hormuz chokes a vital oil artery as 20 percent of global supply is disrupted and crude prices surge. - REUTERS
AS this is written Iranian Parliament has called for the Strait of Hormuz to be closed. Crude oil prices have spike. 20 percent of the world's oil production that passes through here is jammed.
AI Brief
The Iran-Israel and US war has hit home; even though prices of Malaysian crude oil have shot up.
However, when it comes to the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged Beijing to dissuade Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz, he inadvertently exposed a longstanding flaw in American strategic thinking: the tendency to overestimate China’s influence on Iran.
US has to understand it does not run the world and neither does China, which is why wars and restraint as urged by the Group Chair of ASEAN and Related Summits, which is Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is not baseless.
The idea that Beijing can simply call Tehran and stop it from escalating in one of the world’s most critical energy choke points is detached from the reality of Iranian strategic behavior, and from China’s own cautious regional role.
Rubio’s suggestion that “the Chinese government in Beijing should call them about that” reflects an assumption that economic interdependence—specifically China’s reliance on Iranian oil—automatically translates into strategic sway.
While China is Iran’s biggest oil customer, this relationship does not confer Beijing the authority to shape Tehran’s military calculations, particularly in high-stakes zones like the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran’s Strategic Culture: Autonomy Over Alignment
At the heart of this misreading is a failure to understand Iran’s revolutionary state identity. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has prided itself on an independent foreign policy. Its resistance to foreign domination—whether from the U.S., Europe, Russia, or even China—is not rhetorical posturing; it is structural.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has control over strategic choke points like Hormuz, takes its orders from the Supreme Leader, not from foreign capitals. Tehran is prepared to cooperate with China where mutual interests align, but it will not outsource its national security decisions—even if that means risking the ire of its largest oil buyer.
This is why the U.S. overestimates China’s influence: Iran’s posture is not dictated by economic logic alone. It is deeply ideological and strategic. Threats to close the Strait of Hormuz are often intended as political signals to Washington and its Gulf allies—not bargaining chips to be neutralized by third parties.
Strategic Equidistance: China’s Balancing Act, Not Control
China’s approach to Iran—and to the broader Middle East—is grounded in strategic equidistance, not alliance-building. While Beijing does buy Iranian oil and signs memoranda of understanding, it also maintains robust relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. China’s goal is not to control Iran but to maintain enough distance and access to all parties so that its own energy and trade interests are not jeopardized.
This explains why China often stays silent during flare-ups involving Iran. It issues generic calls for "restraint" but avoids taking sides or intervening in crises. The U.S. overestimates China’s influence when it expects Beijing to function as a crisis manager for Tehran. In truth, Beijing lacks both the military footprint and the political will to discipline Iran, especially when doing so would risk undermining its own carefully hedged regional relationships.
Beijing’s limited presence in the Persian Gulf—compared to the sprawling U.S. military infrastructure—is another constraint. It does not operate regional naval patrols capable of influencing Iranian actions. Nor does it lead multilateral security frameworks. Instead, China emphasizes economic development, infrastructure diplomacy, and non-interference—principles that do not lend themselves to controlling another state’s security posture.
Misplaced Expectations: Dependency Does Not Equal Leverage
Washington’s tendency to equate oil dependency with influence ignores Iran’s unique political calculus.
Tehran has withstood decades of sanctions, war, and international isolation precisely because it does not yield to economic pressure in the way many other states might. Even in its most sanctioned moments, Iran found ways to export oil, forge regional alliances, and retain strategic relevance. China may be its top customer today, but if Beijing were to pressure Tehran too hard, Iran would simply turn to other partners—perhaps Russia, Venezuela, or barter arrangements with regional allies.
This is another reason why the U.S. overestimates China’s influence on Iran: Washington sees the world in transactional terms—assuming that financial leverage leads to political compliance. But for Tehran, strategic autonomy trumps short-term economic gain.
Rubio’s Deflection: Outsourcing Gulf Stability to China
Secretary Rubio’s suggestion may also serve a political purpose: to shift the burden of Gulf stability away from Washington and toward Beijing.
By publicly “encouraging” China to intervene, Rubio can argue that the U.S. is not solely responsible for restraining Iran. Yet this is not only unrealistic—it is strategically incoherent. China has shown little interest in becoming a Gulf policeman, and even if it wanted to, it lacks the intelligence, assets, and regional trust to do so effectively.
Ironically, expecting China to restrain Iran shows that the U.S. has misread both countries. It assumes a hierarchical patron-client relationship where there is, in fact, strategic caution and mutual distrust. Iran will not tolerate Chinese interference in its core security decisions, and China will not jeopardize its regional neutrality for the sake of managing U.S.-Iran tensions.
Conclusion: Washington Needs Realism, Not Wishful Thinking
Secretary Rubio’s appeal to China over the Strait of Hormuz may play well in the domestic media, but it reflects a deeper strategic blind spot. The U.S. overestimates China’s influence on Iran because it misjudges the nature of their relationship, overvalues economic dependency as a tool of persuasion, and underestimates the ideological and strategic tenacity of the Iranian regime.
Rather than relying on Beijing to contain Tehran, Washington would do better to recalibrate its own policy: invest in multilateral diplomacy, reduce reliance on coercive tools like sanctions, and recognize the limitations of proxy expectations. In the Gulf, as elsewhere, the illusion of Chinese control can lead to strategic complacency. The sooner this misperception is corrected, the more coherent U.S. policy in the region can become.
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and a Cambridge Commonwealth Fellow.
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.
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AI Brief
- Iran values independence over alliances, so China's economic ties don't translate into control over Tehran's military decisions.
- The US misjudges the Iran-China dynamic, expecting Beijing to rein in Iran despite China's cautious, neutral Gulf strategy.
- Rubio's call for China to manage Iran is unrealistic, reflecting a US habit of overestimating leverage and deflecting responsibility.
The Iran-Israel and US war has hit home; even though prices of Malaysian crude oil have shot up.
However, when it comes to the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged Beijing to dissuade Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz, he inadvertently exposed a longstanding flaw in American strategic thinking: the tendency to overestimate China’s influence on Iran.
US has to understand it does not run the world and neither does China, which is why wars and restraint as urged by the Group Chair of ASEAN and Related Summits, which is Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is not baseless.
The idea that Beijing can simply call Tehran and stop it from escalating in one of the world’s most critical energy choke points is detached from the reality of Iranian strategic behavior, and from China’s own cautious regional role.
Rubio’s suggestion that “the Chinese government in Beijing should call them about that” reflects an assumption that economic interdependence—specifically China’s reliance on Iranian oil—automatically translates into strategic sway.
While China is Iran’s biggest oil customer, this relationship does not confer Beijing the authority to shape Tehran’s military calculations, particularly in high-stakes zones like the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran’s Strategic Culture: Autonomy Over Alignment
At the heart of this misreading is a failure to understand Iran’s revolutionary state identity. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has prided itself on an independent foreign policy. Its resistance to foreign domination—whether from the U.S., Europe, Russia, or even China—is not rhetorical posturing; it is structural.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has control over strategic choke points like Hormuz, takes its orders from the Supreme Leader, not from foreign capitals. Tehran is prepared to cooperate with China where mutual interests align, but it will not outsource its national security decisions—even if that means risking the ire of its largest oil buyer.
This is why the U.S. overestimates China’s influence: Iran’s posture is not dictated by economic logic alone. It is deeply ideological and strategic. Threats to close the Strait of Hormuz are often intended as political signals to Washington and its Gulf allies—not bargaining chips to be neutralized by third parties.
Strategic Equidistance: China’s Balancing Act, Not Control
China’s approach to Iran—and to the broader Middle East—is grounded in strategic equidistance, not alliance-building. While Beijing does buy Iranian oil and signs memoranda of understanding, it also maintains robust relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. China’s goal is not to control Iran but to maintain enough distance and access to all parties so that its own energy and trade interests are not jeopardized.
This explains why China often stays silent during flare-ups involving Iran. It issues generic calls for "restraint" but avoids taking sides or intervening in crises. The U.S. overestimates China’s influence when it expects Beijing to function as a crisis manager for Tehran. In truth, Beijing lacks both the military footprint and the political will to discipline Iran, especially when doing so would risk undermining its own carefully hedged regional relationships.
Beijing’s limited presence in the Persian Gulf—compared to the sprawling U.S. military infrastructure—is another constraint. It does not operate regional naval patrols capable of influencing Iranian actions. Nor does it lead multilateral security frameworks. Instead, China emphasizes economic development, infrastructure diplomacy, and non-interference—principles that do not lend themselves to controlling another state’s security posture.
Misplaced Expectations: Dependency Does Not Equal Leverage
Washington’s tendency to equate oil dependency with influence ignores Iran’s unique political calculus.
Tehran has withstood decades of sanctions, war, and international isolation precisely because it does not yield to economic pressure in the way many other states might. Even in its most sanctioned moments, Iran found ways to export oil, forge regional alliances, and retain strategic relevance. China may be its top customer today, but if Beijing were to pressure Tehran too hard, Iran would simply turn to other partners—perhaps Russia, Venezuela, or barter arrangements with regional allies.
This is another reason why the U.S. overestimates China’s influence on Iran: Washington sees the world in transactional terms—assuming that financial leverage leads to political compliance. But for Tehran, strategic autonomy trumps short-term economic gain.
Rubio’s Deflection: Outsourcing Gulf Stability to China
Secretary Rubio’s suggestion may also serve a political purpose: to shift the burden of Gulf stability away from Washington and toward Beijing.
By publicly “encouraging” China to intervene, Rubio can argue that the U.S. is not solely responsible for restraining Iran. Yet this is not only unrealistic—it is strategically incoherent. China has shown little interest in becoming a Gulf policeman, and even if it wanted to, it lacks the intelligence, assets, and regional trust to do so effectively.
Ironically, expecting China to restrain Iran shows that the U.S. has misread both countries. It assumes a hierarchical patron-client relationship where there is, in fact, strategic caution and mutual distrust. Iran will not tolerate Chinese interference in its core security decisions, and China will not jeopardize its regional neutrality for the sake of managing U.S.-Iran tensions.
Conclusion: Washington Needs Realism, Not Wishful Thinking
Secretary Rubio’s appeal to China over the Strait of Hormuz may play well in the domestic media, but it reflects a deeper strategic blind spot. The U.S. overestimates China’s influence on Iran because it misjudges the nature of their relationship, overvalues economic dependency as a tool of persuasion, and underestimates the ideological and strategic tenacity of the Iranian regime.
Rather than relying on Beijing to contain Tehran, Washington would do better to recalibrate its own policy: invest in multilateral diplomacy, reduce reliance on coercive tools like sanctions, and recognize the limitations of proxy expectations. In the Gulf, as elsewhere, the illusion of Chinese control can lead to strategic complacency. The sooner this misperception is corrected, the more coherent U.S. policy in the region can become.
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and a Cambridge Commonwealth Fellow.
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.