US-Iranian clash empowers China’s own quest for technological superiority

WHEN the United States and Israel targeted Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, many saw the escalation as a flashpoint that could trigger a wider regional war. But one critical actor chose silence over sabre-rattling: China. That silence was not born of weakness or indifference—it was a calculated expression of Beijing’s core principle. For China, technological ascendancy is the primary battlefield, and no amount of strategic bombing in Iran can help achieve it.

AI Brief

Beijing sees military conflicts like the Israel-Iran war as liabilities that hinder innovation.
Over 40% of China's oil comes from the West Asia; conflict risks energy disruption.
China seeks influence through trade, diplomacy, and infrastructure - not militarism.

If the 20th century was defined by ideology and alliances, the 21st is increasingly defined by innovation and resilience. China has anchored its rise not in the politics of regime change or proxy conflict, but in sustained technological capacity-building. To understand why Beijing will not support or exploit a war in Iran for strategic gain, one must grasp the internal logic of China’s long-term strategy—one where precision trumps provocation, and where war is viewed not as a lever for dominance, but a liability.

From Huawei’s 5G networks to Baidu’s autonomous driving systems, China’s rise has been fueled by relentless investment in civilian infrastructure and dual-use technologies—not by military expansionism abroad. While the U.S. fights through forward deployment, China builds through forward integration. This is especially visible in sectors like AI, advanced semiconductors, biotech, and green energy. Iran’s war theatre—no matter how symbolic in challenging U.S. hegemony—offers China no shortcuts. The infrastructure China needs to master next-gen innovation cannot be reverse-engineered from warzones. The People’s Republic needs access to cleanroom technologies, rare earths, nanofabrication plants, high-talent research centers, and stable energy markets—not entanglement in a battlefield of drones and bunkers.

While the United States can afford to weaponize its energy independence, China cannot. Over 40 percent of China’s oil comes from the Middle East, with a large volume flowing through the Strait of Hormuz. A direct Iranian confrontation with the U.S.—especially if extended—would jeopardize the very foundation of China’s energy security.

For this reason, Beijing has always approached the Middle East through a logic of equilibrium. In 2023, China successfully brokered a diplomatic thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran—a feat few believed possible. That mediation illustrated China’s intention to remain an impartial economic power, not a military one. A war in Iran that disrupts Gulf energy shipments is not an opportunity for Beijing—it is a disaster.

Furthermore, U.S. attempts to pressure China to restrain Iran (as Secretary Marco Rubio did recently) betray a misunderstanding of Beijing’s influence. Iran is not China’s client state, and while Beijing has close energy ties with Tehran, it is not in a position to unilaterally dictate Iranian military behavior. What China can do—and has done—is promote de-escalation through multilateral diplomacy and regional cooperation, not coercion.

Iran may offer symbolic resistance to Western dominance, but its technological ecosystem is too isolated and sanctioned to meaningfully contribute to China’s innovation goals. Unlike Japan, South Korea, or even Russia, Iran lacks the ability to co-develop advanced chips, quantum processors, or space systems with China. Indeed, war in Iran invites additional sanctions, impedes logistical flow in BRI corridors, and forces Chinese firms to walk a tightrope of reputational risk. In a globalized economy, association with rogue actions can lead to exclusion from vital markets. Beijing remembers the fallout of Huawei’s skirmishes with Western regulators. The Chinese Communist Party will not risk the broader Made in China 2025 agenda for tactical alignment with a besieged Tehran. For Chinese strategists, technological superiority is a function of internal resilience and external connectivity—not of piggybacking on pariah states.

Beijing’s refusal to take sides militarily does not mean it is sitting idle. On the contrary, China is playing a complex, quiet game of positioning itself as the indispensable broker. It maintains strong ties not only with Iran, but also with Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. This position allows China to present itself as the world’s alternative to American militarism—one that builds rather than bombs. In a global order fractured by ideology and force, China’s brand of techno-diplomacy appeals to nations exhausted by war. This is especially true in ASEAN, the Gulf, and Africa, where countries prefer infrastructure, trade, and digital transformation over military bases and missile defense systems.

In this sense, a war in Iran is antithetical to China’s geopolitical brand. It pulls Beijing into zero-sum camps. It burns bridges with Gulf monarchies. And it jeopardizes China’s ability to present its Belt and Road Initiative as a peace-oriented, future-ready vision of global connectivity.

China’s aspiration is not just to dominate markets, but to shape values—how the world thinks about technology, surveillance, governance, and innovation. From the global expansion of TikTok to the development of AI-based governance systems exported to Africa and Central Asia, China is creating a normative alternative to the liberal digital order. To preserve that influence, Beijing must remain beyond the fray. It must avoid association with hardline theocracies or rogue military behavior. Supporting or even condoning a war in Iran undercuts the credibility of China's “peaceful rise” and undermines its ability to shape the ethical frameworks surrounding new technologies. Technology thrives in credibility. War erodes it.

As the dust settles over Iran’s bombed-out centrifuges, the real test is not in Tehran or Tel Aviv—but in Beijing’s restraint. China’s global ambitions cannot be furthered by regional conflagration. War may redraw maps, but it does not design chips, build supercomputers, or invent new forms of energy.

The architects of the Chinese century know that success lies in securing access to lithium, not launching missiles. It lies in patents, not provocations. And it is measured not in battle victories, but in market dominance and normative influence.

Iran is a cautionary tale, not a calling. China will continue to engage Tehran—economically, diplomatically, and cautiously—but it will never mistake war for wisdom.

To paraphrase the Confucian adage: When others raise their fists, raise your standards.

Phar Kim Beng is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and a former Head Teaching Fellow at Harvard University.

** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.