Vietnam has a framework but not necessarily a deal with the US

But in reality, what was presented as a breakthrough is more of a political stopgap. Vietnam has not secured a trade deal—what it has is a framework, and frameworks, by definition, are outlines, not conclusions.

The declaration came during a 90-day tariff freeze announced by the Trump administration in April, a window created to give countries time to negotiate “fair and reciprocal” trade arrangements with Washington. So far, only the United Kingdom and now Vietnam have managed to reach some sort of understanding. But to describe these as deals would be a stretch. They are best seen as strategic attempts to buy time—and not necessarily solutions that address the structural concerns raised by either side.

The Joint Vietnam–U.S. Statement regarding a Framework for Fair and Reciprocal Trade Agreements, issued following a phone call between President Donald Trump and Vietnamese General Secretary To Lam, closely mirrors the vague framework deal signed with the UK in May.

Neither are full trade agreements with enforceable clauses, clear dispute settlement mechanisms, or detailed schedules for tariff rollbacks.

Instead, they serve as non-binding outlines for future negotiations. No public text has been released. No legal terms ratified. This gives Trump flexibility to boast of his negotiation prowess while still leaving the door open to impose tariffs later—particularly if political pressure mounts or domestic economic data turns sour.

The headline figure—Vietnamese imports to the U.S. to be taxed at 20 percent instead of 46 percent—does represent a partial concession. But the fine print reveals an asymmetry. In return, Vietnam is to remove all tariffs on U.S. goods. While Hanoi gains temporary relief from a higher baseline, Washington walks away with a deeper opening into one of Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing markets.

Furthermore, any Vietnamese exports suspected of being transshipped—especially goods rerouted from China—will still face a punitive 40 percent tariff.

The Trump administration has not disclosed how transshipment will be determined, nor whether Vietnam will have any input in that determination. That lack of clarity places Vietnamese exporters in an extremely vulnerable position, exposed to the unilateral discretion of U.S. customs enforcement.

General Secretary To Lam had reportedly made two major requests during the negotiation process:

1. That the U.S. officially recognize Vietnam as a market economy, and

2. That restrictions on the export of high-tech U.S. products to Vietnam be lifted.

The first would have shielded Vietnam from high anti-dumping duties under U.S. trade law. The second would have facilitated Vietnam’s transition up the manufacturing value chain.

Yet, neither demand has been met—nor even acknowledged—in the official statements following the July 2 announcement. These omissions are not mere diplomatic footnotes. They are indications that the core issues remain unresolved.

Vietnam is acting from a position of necessity, not strength. As the third-largest trade surplus holder with the United States and the sixth-largest overall trading partner, it is highly exposed to Trump’s aggressive tariff policies.

The relocation of many supply chains from China to Vietnam during the first Trump administration further magnified this exposure. Hanoi became a convenient surrogate for China in America’s eyes. Two days after the tariff threat was first issued in April, To Lam was already on the phone with Trump, requesting to open negotiations.

This is not a sign of strategic leverage. It is a sign of geopolitical vulnerability. Vietnam feared what a 46 percent tariff would do to its export-driven economy and decided that any deal—even a weak one—was better than no deal.

The negotiations were also accompanied by unusually cozy political gestures.

In May, the Vietnamese government fast-tracked approval of a Trump Organization resort and golf course.

Eric Trump himself visited Ho Chi Minh City to scout for potential sites, including for a new Trump Tower.

These developments raise important questions about the integrity of the negotiation process.

When policy is blurred with personal profit, the outcomes are often distorted.

Hanoi’s willingness to approve Trump business ventures while negotiations were ongoing casts a shadow over the substance and fairness of the agreement.

Vietnam’s baseline tariff of 20 percent, while high, looks preferable compared to its neighbors:

Cambodia: 49%

Laos: 48%

Thailand: 36%

Indonesia: 32%

Malaysia and Brunei: 24%

Philippines: 17%

These countries are all in various stages of negotiations with Washington.

Only Singapore, due to its free trade credentials, is exempt.

Among the rest, Vietnam is the most trade-dependent on the U.S. and therefore the most eager to avoid a tariff escalation.

But it has done so by accepting vague promises and giving up significant trade concessions without certainty of protection.

All of this is taking place in the shadow of the looming July 9 deadline, when the 90-day tariff reprieve ends. If no detailed sectoral agreements are finalized, Vietnam may still find itself exposed to tariffs on high-value industries like automobiles, steel, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and critical minerals.

The framework does not protect against future actions—especially given how broad and unpredictable Trump’s trade policies have proven to be. In short, Vietnam may have postponed a crisis, but it has not escaped it.

Vietnam’s so-called deal with the United States is, at best, an agreement to keep talking. It lacks binding detail, fails to resolve core economic concerns, and leaves Hanoi vulnerable to American enforcement discretion.

Until both sides publish an actual, signed trade agreement with enforceable terms and clear timelines, this remains a political performance, not a policy victory. Hanoi has a framework. But it does not yet have a deal.