As of November 2024, UNHCR Malaysia recorded 192,170 refugees and asylum seekers, primarily from Myanmar, Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Most are from Myanmar, including 111,410 Rohingyas, 27,840 Chins, and 31,100 other ethnic groups.
Drawn by Malaysia’s peace, security, and economic opportunities, Rohingyas began arriving as early as the 1970s, fleeing political persecution in Burma (Harun, 2019). Despite local acceptance, the community still faces limited access to employment, education, and affordable healthcare—primarily because Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which provides refugees with legal protection, rights, and assistance.
Refugees At Risk of Radicalisation
Although there is no conclusive evidence directly linking refugees to terrorism, research on migration and terrorism posits that populations displaced by repression, civil war, or violence at home can become potential sites for plotting extremist acts (Schimd, 2016). Moreover, the vulnerabilities refugees often face—emotional trauma, mental health challenges, uncertain legal status, and economic hardship—are recognised risk factors for radicalisation (RAN, 2019).
Refugees in Malaysia typically resort to performing “3D” jobs—dirty, dangerous, and difficult—due to the absence of legal work rights. Besides, high medical costs remain a burden despite UNHCR subsidising half the expenses. Limited access to formal education further constrains refugees’ social mobility and heightens their exposure to radicalisation. According to Weine and Ahmed (2012), idle time and unobserved environments can serve as risk factors for radicalisation, particularly among youth.
The precarious circumstances facing refugee communities can heighten their susceptibility to radicalisation and exploitation by extremist groups. According to IMAN Research (2019) findings, frustration, anger, alienation, and distrust among Rohingya refugees in Malaysia may propel them toward violent extremism.
Refugees may also turn to extremist organisations for financial assistance when legitimate work opportunities in Malaysia are scarce. Additionally, inadequate integration into host communities can increase their vulnerability to radicalisation.
Malaysia has been criticised for its harsh detention centres (Al Jazeera, May 2024), where detainees reportedly endure abuse, torture, and a lack of judicial recourse. Overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, combined with limited food and water, compound the hardship. Because refugees—already socially isolated and facing multiple crises— are more susceptible to extremist ideologies, these facilities can become hotbeds for radicalisation, much like prisons (ICSR, 2010). Concerningly, UNHCR has been barred from visiting Malaysian immigration depots since 2019.
VE&T Threats Within Malaysia’s Refugee Community
Following the 2021 military coup, the Burmese government’s conflict with ethnic rebel groups escalated, propelling the country to ninth place in the 2023 Global Terrorism Index. This civil strife has drawn intense scrutiny from ASEAN countries worried about the potential spillover effect of terrorism that could compromise both national and regional security.
The Rohingya crisis has not only revealed the Burmese government’s pervasive human rights abuses but has also triggered regional and global pro-Rohingya jihadist sentiments (Singh & Haziq, 2016). In Indonesia, online extremists openly called for jihad on behalf of the Rohingya, while Muhammad Wanndy—the mastermind behind the 2016 Movida pub attack—urged his followers to kill any Burmese Buddhist individual they encountered in Malaysia and Indonesia. The Islamic State (IS) similarly encouraged its supporters to travel to Myanmar if access to Syria was not feasible.
Concerns have emerged that Rohingya refugees may be susceptible to influence by regional terrorist organisations, including Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) (Mahalingam, 2022).
Evidence of ARSA’s outreach to the Rohingya community in Malaysia is well-documented. Like many terrorist organisations, ARSA skilfully exploits social media platforms—especially Facebook and YouTube—to advance and coordinate its terrorist activities.
A YouTube channel called “Rohingya Malay Kelas,” originally established to teach Malay and English to Rohingya refugees, was discovered to feature several videos promoting ARSA’s objectives (Singh & Fernando, 2022). In 2019, Malaysian counter-terrorism police also arrested four Rohingyas for orchestrating an extortion plot across seven Peninsular states to fund ARSA (South China Morning Post, 2019).
Meanwhile, leading countries in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)—particularly those hosting refugees, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Finland—have integrated refugees into their respective P/CVE strategies. Notably, Finland’s national action plan designates one of its 14 actions to address refugees as a high-risk group for radicalisation. Despite its sizable refugee population, Malaysia’s current P/CVE framework fails to account for this vital dimension, indicating an urgent need for refugee-focused interventions.
Noteworthy, socio-economic drivers can also motivate self-radicalisation and lone-wolf attacks—recurrent themes in Malaysia’s recent VE&T-related incidents—that are more difficult to detect than coordinated terrorist plots.
To effectively address the root causes of radicalisation among refugees, it is crucial to first meet their basic needs by providing employment, education, and access to healthcare. Ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention would eliminate legal barriers preventing refugees from improving their quality of life while enabling them to contribute to Malaysia’s national development.
A 2019 study by the Institute of Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) revealed that Malaysia could reap considerable economic benefits by allowing refugees to work legally beyond 3D sectors. Notably, annual GDP could surpass RM6.5 billion by 2040, with RM250 million in yearly tax contributions and over 4,000 new jobs generated for Malaysians.
Support from various local businesses and multinational corporations (MNCs)—including Airbnb, Uniqlo, and Unilever—for legally employing refugees reinforces the need for policy reforms that permit refugees to engage in Malaysia’s economic sector meaningfully.
As discussed in EMIR Research’s previous article “Empowering Malaysia’s Future: A Youth-Centric Approach to P/CVE”, countries are increasingly placing youth empowerment at the forefront of their P/CVE efforts, emphasising education and personal development. For instance, Martin-Rayo (2011) found that Kenyan youths who received even minimal education refrained from joining Al-Shaabab, an East African jihadist militant organisation. Schools also play a pivotal role in integrating refugee children into host communities and bolstering their resilience against radicalisation (RAN, 2019). Following the European Union’s (EU) lead—such as youth work, entrepreneurship programs, and volunteering—have effectively empowered refugee youths across member states.
Reports of abysmal living conditions and abuses in Malaysia’s detention centres underscore the urgent need for systematic reform. Despite being a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)—which prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and inhumane treatment—refugees and migrants in Malaysia frequently face such violations in immigration detention facilities.
Front-liners who work with refugees, especially in environments prone to extremist ideologies such as prisons and detention centres, should be equipped with adequate resources and training to increase their awareness of radicalisation. This can substantially help identify early warning signs and implement appropriate rehabilitative measures. Additionally, educators teaching refugee students must maintain trauma-sensitive learning environments and adopt trauma-informed practices, given that many refugees grapple with mental health challenges. All of this points to the necessity to start professionalising our P/CVE efforts with heavy reliance on an evidence-based approach, in line with global trends.
Beyond monitoring refugees who may be at risk, it is equally important to recognise their potential as valuable P/CVE partners, given their firsthand experience with VE&T. By developing P/CVE leadership initiatives that train refugees to lead counter-terrorism narratives within their communities, overall resilience against extremist ideologies can be significantly strengthened.
Inclusivity and social cohesion are foundational to a peaceful society, particularly in a country as ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse as Malaysia. Drawing on global P/CVE best practices, a proactive strategy should further promote peaceful coexistence, diversity, and tolerance—achieved through educational programs, community engagement, and social services that integrate refugees into Malaysian society.
To more effectively address VE&T threats, P/CVE interventions must incorporate refugees’ perspectives. This entails not only ensuring refugees’ basic survival needs are met but also formally recognising them as at-risk groups for radicalisation.
* Dr Margarita Peredaryenko and Avyce Heng are part of the research team at EMIR Research, an independent think tank focused on strategic policy recommendations based on rigorous research.
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.
