The beheading of the Egyptians were captured on video and released on Sunday with the authenticity of the footage confirmed by both the Egyptian governments and the Coptic Church.
In what seemed to be an intensifying campaign of the IS fighters, the gruesome footage showed the Egyptians, all clad in orange jump suits, beheaded in the vicinity of a waterfront, believed to be located in the Libyan province of Tripoli.
Nations across the globe have since condemned the militants’ atrocities.
In an email Q&A session with Guy Burton, University of Nottingham Malaysia's Assistant Prof of School of Politics, History and International Relations and former Britain political lobbyist, he provided insights into the issue.
Q: In previous beheading by the IS, the group usually seeks ransom before killing. Why did the IS decide to dive straight into execution this time around?
A: The IS is not a monolithic group, although its aspirations are to establish a caliphate across the region. But, in practice it operates more like a franchise, with the Libyan arm in Libya having only emerged relatively recently, since last year. So how IS operates in Libya may be slightly different in some ways to that of the original group in Syria/Iraq.
IS has demanded ransoms for hostages in the past, mainly in the Syria/Iraq theatres. But how relevant this is when there are other potential sources of revenue coming in – e.g. smuggling of oil, imposition of enforced taxation in the areas it controls – may reduce the need for ransoms.
It's believed that the $200m (RM716.9m) price tag they demanded in exchange of the two Japanese hostages subsequently murdered was more symbolic – reflecting the amount the Japanese are spending in the region.
In Libya, IS doesn't have access to oil revenues (yet), but it may be generating income from tax/extortion in cities like Derna, in the eastern part of the country where it is believed to have its main base.
A Coptic clergyman shows a picture of a man whom he says is one of the Egyptian Coptic Christians purportedly murdered by the IS group militants in Libya, on Feb 16, 2015, during a memorial ceremony in the village of al-Awar in Egypt's southern province of Minya. Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi vowed to punish the "murderers" responsible for the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians after the IS group in Libya released a video on Feb 15, purportedly showing the mass killing. – AFP Photo/Mohamed el-Shahed
Q: Egypt last year denied reports of having carried out air strikes on Islamists in Libya, but US officials said its ally, the United Arab Emirates, carried out the strikes using Egyptian bases. Could this be the bone of contention to IS' strike?
A: That may be one explanation for the actions of IS. It's no secret that the Egyptian government is extremely anti-Islamist, having shut down and chasing its own, more moderate Muslim Brotherhood opposition.
But it is also important to note the situation within Libya. The state has largely collapsed; there are two rival governments, one internationally-recognised in the east and another, more Islamist-aligned in the west of the country.
And in between them is a swirl of other militias – tribal, religious, regional – who are all competing for space. IS is in competition with other Islamist groups operating in the country and from what we know of their use of social media and publicity, this may be another way of generating more attention and recruits.
A pedestrian looks at a large screen in Tokyo on Jan 28, 2015 showing television news reports about Japanese hostage Kenji Goto who was kidnapped by the IS. Goto's killing was announced in a video posted on Jan 31 by IS militants and came a week after his friend and fellow captive Haruna Yukawa was beheaded. – AFP Photo/Kazuhiro Nogi
Q: What is (if any) the grand scale ultimatum that IS might have?
A: IS wants a caliphate across the region, over the Muslim world. Its Libyan franchise helps broaden its 'appeal' beyond being a group that is largely confined to the Syria/Iraq sub-region. That said, there is probably only limited direction between the Islamic State's original base in Syria/Iraq and its junior affiliate in Libya. The presence of training camps (according to intelligence) in the east of the country may provide some interaction between the two groups, but much of the day-to-day activity is likely to be determined by the situation on the ground.
Q: The United Nation's Mission in Libya has called for the group's action to be "rejected and denounced by all Libyans". How significant is the role of the UN in the crisis?
A: The UN has been struggling to bring together the different sides, to engineer ceasefires and promote dialogue or peace talks. The UN was active all last year on this but it has been unsuccessful in getting all sides together. Last September it oversaw an international conference in Madrid where the only thing agreed was to not recognise the government in the western half of the country. The UN Security Council has published statements for a political solution and passed resolutions threatening sanctions against individuals involved in the fighting, but this doesn't seem to have made much of a difference.
Q: In your opinion, would the IS continue perpetrating its heinous killings, and when at all would they stop?
A: It's unlikely that IS is going to stop carrying out its actions. Beheading hostages has become a trademark of the group and provides it with media exposure and attention. When combined with other actions (like the bombing of the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli last month and rapid territorial advances in Iraq last summer), it appears 'successful' and therefore attracts further recruits.
To turn back the IS – and other extremist Islamist groups – is going to require a range of actions. Military action isn't enough. The causes of disaffection and discontent which has enabled recruitment needs to be addressed.
An image uploaded on June 14, 2014 on the ‘jihadist’ website Welayat Salahuddin allegedly shows militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) executing dozens of captured Iraqi security forces members at an unknown location in the Salaheddin province. A major offensive spearheaded by ISIL but also involving supporters of executed dictator Saddam Hussein has overrun all of one province and chunks of three others since it was launched on June 9 that year. – AFP Photo
Politically, governments in the region need to stop repressing and persecuting the opposition. They need to distinguish between moderate and extremist political Islam. Lumping them all together isn't going to help. Foreign governments have to stop condoning this sort of repression. American and European government have a bad record (justifiably so in many instances). They need to find ways to support more constructive ways to engage the region's people.
Economically, governments, entrepreneurs and others need to tackle the stagnant character of much of the region, build industry and provide jobs. The region's population is growing and is becoming increasingly youthful - yet in parts of the region unemployment is reaching 20%. Unless people are given opportunity to play a meaningful role, they are likely to feel disconnected and seek alternatives.
Socially, Muslims have to address the issue of extremist Islam. In the West we've seen in the discussion around 'radicalisation' (where young Muslims in the UK, France, and other states have made the journey out to Syria to join Islamic State) that there's a fine line between some of the very conservative sentiments and expressions made by religious Islamic leaders in the mosque, which are then exploited by these extremist groups.
Increasingly, there is realisation that the issue needs to be dealt with – but it is has to come from within the Muslim community, not by outsiders.
