Taiwan under pressure, Southeast Asia at risk

RECENT People’s Republic of China activity east of Taiwan suggests Beijing is expanding geopolitical pressure on Taipei.  In August 2026, a Chinese fishing vessel, believed to be part of a maritime militia, was operating alongside a Chinese coast guard vessel and a research ship near Taiwan’s eastern coast. Since June 2026, Chinese coast guard activity east of Taiwan has increased.

For years, the Taiwan question has been framed around the possibility of China launching a full-scale military operation to achieve what Beijing describes as reunification. Nevertheless, for Southeast Asia, the more immediate danger may lie below the threshold of a war.

However, this does not prove that blockade is imminent. The more important question is which of Beijing’s capabilities it is gradually normalising.

Taiwan’s eastern coastline faces the Pacific and is strategically important for maintaining external access during a geopolitical crisis. A persistent Chinese presence would strengthen Beijing’s ability to surround, monitor, and potentially isolate the island without immediately resorting to conventional military force.

The escalation could unfold incrementally. Coastguard patrols and maritime militia operations are expanding, and surveillance is becoming more persistent. Beijing could eventually seek to impose inspection or regulatory authority on vessels approaching Taiwan. The crucial transition is from presence to asserted jurisdiction.

A Chinese naval vessel preventing a commercial ship from reaching Taiwan would clearly be a case of military coercion. However, a coastguard vessel claiming authority to inspect the same ship creates significant ambiguity. 

Through grey-zone tactics, Beijing could frame such action as law enforcement rather than warfare, complicating the response of Taiwan, the United States, and other governments. For Southeast Asia, this method is familiar.

China has long combined coast guard vessels and maritime militias in the South China Sea. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative estimated an average daily presence of 241 Chinese militia vessels across the monitored South China Sea features in 2025. 

Similar militia vessels have assisted Chinese activities around contested areas involving the Philippines and elsewhere in the Spratly Islands.

Taiwan may therefore be facing a method that Southeast Asian governments have already experienced: establishing presence, making it routine, and gradually reinforcing claims of authority over contested waters. The implications extend beyond maritime security.

At this juncture, Taiwan is at the centre of regional technology and manufacturing networks. In 2025, Singapore’s bilateral trade with Taiwan reached US$53.4 billion, Taiwan-Vietnam trade reached US$32.5 billion, and Taiwan’s trade with Thailand amounted to US$19.4 billion. 

Taiwan also supplied 47.9 per cent of Thailand’s integrated circuit imports, while Malaysia-Taiwan trade reached RM233 billion. Hence, a Taiwan crisis would not remain a Taiwan problem.

Even a temporary quarantine could disrupt semiconductor deliveries, raise shipping and insurance costs, delay electronics production, and encourage firms to build larger inventories. 

Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines would face different levels of exposure, but all are embedded in regional manufacturing networks in which Taiwanese technology, firms, and components play significant roles.

The Philippines faces additional vulnerabilities. Northern Luzon lies close to Taiwan and the Bashi Channel, placing the country near any confrontation involving Chinese and American forces. Manila’s alliance with Washington makes crisis management particularly sensitive, even without direct Philippine involvement in hostilities.

Although Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam maintain varying security relationships with Washington, they remain deeply connected to China. Their instinct would be to avoid choosing sides while protecting trade and economic stability. 

However, this becomes harder if a quarantine forces governments to decide whether Chinese inspection demands amount to legitimate law enforcement or coercion against international navigation.

This is why Southeast Asian governments should not measure Taiwan risk solely by aircraft sorties or predictions about invasion. 

More practical indicators include persistent Chinese Coast Guard patrols east of Taiwan, repeated maritime militia deployments, coordinated Coast Guard and naval operations, and attempts to impose inspection, navigation, or regulatory requirements on commercial vessels.

Nonetheless, this does not require Southeast Asian governments to abandon their One China policies or take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. Preparing for a disruption is not the same as choosing sides. 

A more important warning is that the region may be affected long before the war begins. Geopolitical tensions will place Southeast Asian governments under pressure to interpret and respond to major powers’ actions.

Therefore, the real question is whether Beijing will create a new maritime reality around the region. Actions that were once regarded as coercive could become routine, and repeated behaviour eventually acquires the appearance of legitimate authority.

Strategic change does not always arrive through war or territorial seizure. Sometimes, it advances slowly through repeated presence, administrative claims, and the steady narrowing of another actor’s choices.

For ASEAN, the risk is that by the time the first volley is fired, the status quo may have already changed.

Rizal Hamdan is a Senior Program Officer at Merdeka Centre. He writes about geopolitics and foreign affairs for RIMAU Geopolitical Insight on Substack. The views expressed here are his own.

** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.