[COLUMNIST] The changing political dynamics of Bangladesh

THE abrupt downfall of erstwhile Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina came as a surprise or rather unexpectedly.

She was ousted under chaotic circumstances by being forced to resign and flee the country on August 5.

The student-led mass protests which had initially been decrying the historic jobs quotas for the bureaucracy or civil service (in place since the nation’s independence in 1971 partly to honour the sacrifice made by the freedom fighters or Mukti Bahini) later shifted towards targeting the Prime Minister personally.

Up until the very last minute, Sheikh Hasina had clung on to power in the vain and forlorn hope of crushing the uprising.

It was only when close family members prevailed upon her that the untimely and shambolic departure was triggered.

Sheikh Hasina’s security officials calculated that the former Prime Minister was just 45 minutes away from the waves of rioters who by now were making their way towards her official residence (“Timeline: How the final hours of Sheikh Hasina’s crumbling administration unfolded in Dhaka”, Independent, August 7, 2024).

However, the political and social conditions leading to her humiliating and ignominious exit from power and what would perhaps also be the demise in prestige of the prominent Tungipara Sheikh clan and dynasty of which she has been the figure par excellence in current times as the daughter of founding father and independence leader of the nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (popularly known by the honorific title of Bangabandhu – Friend of Bengal), have been in the making for some time.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was also the first President and second Prime Minister of Bangladesh.

By the 1960s, the charismatic Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had already distinguished himself as the foremost (East) Bengali patriot, indefatigable defender of the Bengali language, and intrepid spokesperson of the Awami League against West Pakistani (Punjabi-Sindh, Urdu) supremacy.

His popularity grew when he was imprisoned under the then miliary regime of Ayub Khan. The Bangladeshi War of Liberation/Independence (1971) ignited when the Yahya Khan regime refused to accept the results of the 1970 general election whereby the Awami League went on to be the single largest party in the then composite Pakistan National Assembly.

With India’s timely interventionism, the rest became history.

But with the departure of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s historic ties with India is now called into question.

In consonant with her father’s secular ideals and vision, Sheikh Hasina strove to maintain Bangladesh’s reputation as a moderate and progressive Muslim country. It is said that the religious minorities with particular reference to the Hindu community had felt safe under her premiership.

Nonetheless, the growth of radicalism in the country, especially spread via the madrassas (which look to Pakistan for emulation – in effect (re-adopting the razakar spirit) had affected social stability and tarnished its international image.

The Netflix film Faraaz (2022) – which recounted the fateful events of the 2016 terrorist attack in a leafy suburbia of Dhaka’s Gulshan Thana – encapsulated the challenge of radical Islamist ideology posed to Bangladesh.

It has to be said that Sheikh Hasina has only herself to blame, at the end of the day. She was, to a large extent, the architect of her own downfall.

For one, the admissions scheme into the bureaucracy have traditionally been rife with institutional corruption and nepotism (“Corruption, Public-Sector Job Quotas Top List of Bangladesh's Problems, Local Journalists Tell BTA in Exclusive Interview”. Bulgarian News Agency, August 6, 2024).

As it is, “[t]he civil servants have by and large become accustomed to living a lifestyle far beyond their legal sources of income” (“Growth and Development of Civil Service and Bureaucracy in Bangladesh: An Overview”, Md. Awal Hossain Mollah, South Asian Survey, 18(1), p. 153).

To be sure, the culture of corruption that pervades the civil service is long-standing and pre-dates Sheikh Hasina’s premiership.

When the “austere” faced and lanky Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, a well-known figure throughout the 1980s, assumed the role of chief martial law administrator (CMLA) and subsequently served as the 10th President of Bangladesh, he too had to grapple with a highly corrupt civil service.

Politicians and their associates or cronies are also no different.

Indeed, one of the sparks of mass anger which overthrew Sheik Hasina, in addition to the entrenched corruption in the bureaucracy, was the startling revelation that one of her household aides has been amassing wealth to the tune of Tk4 billion/approximately RM14.5 million (“Hasina’s rich peon in the spotlight”, The Star, July 17, 2024; “Bangladesh PM’s ex-servant who travels by helicopter sparks graft probe over $45m fortune”, The Straits Times, July 15, 2024).

Sheikh Hasina’s nemesis and protagonist, Sheikh Khaleeda Zia (widow of Lieutenant General Ziaur Rahman) of the Majumder-Zia clan and dynasty, also presided over a corrupt political and administrative system and was herself convicted of corruption based on, as some say, dubious charges.

The quota system introduced by Sheikh Mujibur also resulted, by default and intent, in the politicisation of the Bangladeshi bureaucracy (that benefitted archrival Bangladesh Nationalist Party/BNP also when in power) which in turn promoted and reinforced his personality cult (during his lifetime and revived under Sheikh Hasina).

It is one principal factor why nothing much was and could be done to root out corruption by Sheikh Hasina – who following in the footsteps of her late father had become increasingly authoritarian – although “zero tolerance for corruption" was a key pillar of her last-term administration.

It is intriguing that the original student protests over rising youth unemployment and lack of opportunities at access to civil service jobs (with pension entitlements) morphed into the wider revolt against Sheikh Hasina’s rule.

No doubt her close and subservient ties to India played a significant role in this too (see the insightful article, “Fall of Sheikh Hasina: Impact on Bangladesh’s relationship with India”, Ashraf-ud-Doula, Dhaka Tribune, September 5, 2024).

Conspiracy theorists suggest that she has been a RAW (Research & Analysis Wing) agent since the 1970s. RAW has been accused of interference in the domestic affairs of Bangladesh ever since the country’s inception with the help of India – with certain desk officers having a direct line to Sheikh Hasina.

Her brutal crackdown against the (anti-India) Islamists somewhat subdued the movement in the country for a brief period.

Unfortunately, her tenure (which, again, is of her own making) coincided with or contributed to the emergence of a generation of Bangladeshis whose outlook are disconnected from the memories of Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan.

By extension, the fragile and weakening emotional/sentimental rapport with the nation’s founding history has also simultaneously translated into an apathetic and sceptical outlook towards India.

Concomitantly, Bangladesh is also experiencing waning secularism as a sign of disillusionment in response to the moral decadence of political life and culture.

Thus, the “significant” appeal of the Islamists (set within a polarised society to a certain extent, to be sure) – looked upon as the solution to the nation’s woes.

Overall, it can be argued that Bangladesh’s political dynamics is now undergoing a profound shift and change which could damage the country’s historic ties with India for good.

Even with the renowned economist Muhammad Yunus, founder of the micro-credit Grameen Bank, as the current interim head of government, it is highly likely (albeit only a conjecture at present) that he would find it extremely difficult to resist pressures from the Islamists to “model” Bangladesh into a “second Pakistan”.

India’s hope is perhaps for China to be the (pre-eminent) mediator and intercessor.

Ironically in this, the changing political dynamics of Bangladesh, also said by conspiracy theorists to be the handiwork of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), could result in the further “thawing” and strengthening of Sino-India ties.

Malaysia too can play a pivotal role as a mediator and intercessor between Bangladesh and India, if need be.

Both countries (at least Bangladesh for the present) are moderate/progressive Muslim countries and co-members of the Muslim-majority Group of Developing 8 or D8 (see EMIR Research article, “Opportunities of an economically developed D-8”, December 25, 2019).

Pakistan is also a member of the D8.

Malaysia can certainly benefit – in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms – from stronger ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan set within the context of the D8 and on the wider front such as the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation).

At the end of the day, it is hope that the changing political dynamics of Bangladesh will usher in a new dawn and era for the nation.

As the interim/caretaker head of government, the Chief Adviser of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Muhammad Yunus, like his Malaysian counterpart Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, is well-poised to navigate and steer the country towards institutional reforms and systemic changes, thus guiding Bangladesh on to a brighter future whilst fulfilling the yearnings and hope of the people, especially of the younger generation.

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Jason Loh Seong Wei is Head of Social, Law & Human Rights at EMIR Research, an independent think tank focussed on strategic policy recommendations based on rigorous research.

** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.