WHILST Israel had “beaten off” and downgraded the threat from Hamas and Hezbollah, these two Axis of Resistance frontliners remain intact. No small feat, it has to be said, in what’s an asymmetrical conflict with the region’s most technologically superior and powerfully-equipped military.

On the wider strategic front, despite winning consecutively in past Arab-Israeli Wars which themselves are built upon each cumulative strategic initiative, respectively, Israel is now confronted with a new/different situation today.

For one, even though Israel retains the Golan Heights (with de facto annexation supported by the US under Trump) allowing the Zionist entity with the strategic depth to partly face a northern threat, the strategic Sinai Peninsula that’s won during the Six-Day War of 1967 (and also previously occupied under the War of 1956) is now back under Egyptian sovereign control.

Israel withdrew completely in 1982. This represents a loss of strategic initiative in what’s the southern front for the Zionist entity.

The October 7 incursion by Hamas has exposed the strategic vulnerabilities of the southern front, i.e., on the whole.

As it is, the Sinai Peninsula, especially the northern part, is the gateway into Gaza.

For now, following the collapse of the secular Assad regime, Israel had expanded its northern front buffer zone via the Golan Heights. By extension, Israel has added parts of the Syria’s southwest, most principally the Quneitra province which “overlooks” and “covers over” the Druze areas in the deep south as embodied by the Suwayda/Suweida city and province.

Israel has always deemed the minority Druze as a natural and strategic ally alongside the Kurds (irrespective of national borders). 

The next target for the expansion of Israel’s buffer zone could well be the Sinai – considered as an extension of Gaza.

Not necessarily through an invasion per se – but still serving as a buffer zone nonetheless.

Even though a ceasefire deal has been sealed between Netanyahu and Hamas following the brokering and mediating efforts by Qatar (and Egypt), there’s no guarantee that the provisions will be followed through in their entirety.

Since the ceasefire deal comes in three stages, there’s even a possibility that it might break down entirely at some point in time. The first stage of the ceasefire deal which kicked in on January 19 is to last for six weeks.

Since a buffer zone in Sinai would entail war with Egypt, how then would the Zionist entity achieve that without replaying another Arab-Israeli War, at least in the medium-term?

The plan for a “buffer zone” (if at all) would be synchronised and coordinated with the (planned) annexation of Gaza (military governorate) via military occupation which according to the first stage/phase of the ceasefire deal is confined to the northern sector – alongside the retention of the Netzarim Corridor which bisects “near the centre” of the Strip.

If so, this only reinforces the speculation/expectation that the ceasefire deal will apart in due course.

Annexation is seen as the only alternative/excuse so long as Hamas still exists.

In the long-term, the northern sector might be repopulated with Zionist settlements.

The northern sector serving as a buffer zone combined with the Netzarim Corridor which cuts the Gaza Strip into two means that this “half” of the State of Palestine is effectively balkanised like the West Bank already and as envisaged in Trump’s Deal of the Century (DOTC) under his first administration.

The Generals’ (Eiland’s) Plan which depends on cutting off humanitarian aid would still be in place in order to try to force the Gazans out – external displacement as the ultimate goal. This would align with the goal of securing a buffer zone with Egypt.

That is as originally projected, the aim is to displace the Gazans into the Sinai. This would turn the refugees into a “human buffer zone” – with the refugee camps and settlements serving as the buffer between Gaza (under Zionist military occupation) and Egypt. 

As per the current scenario, the Generals’ Plan would hide behind the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) ban which came into effect in January this year.

The UNRWA ban also includes the legal prohibition of any contact between UNRWA and the Zionist regime. It comes at a critical time especially with the implementation of the ceasefire which is meant to also allow for increased aid to come in unhindered/undisrupted into the Gaza Strip on a daily basis (600 lorries of aid with 50 carrying fuel).

Recall that UNRWA has been the backbone of humanitarian response and central lifeline for Palestinian refugees since the Nakba of 1947-1949.

In short, the UNRWA ban will only worsen the humanitarian crisis.

On top of this, it’s thought that some 1.5 million Gazans are still trapped in the southern city of Rafah which is next to the Rafah Crossing into the Sinai.

As such, in looking further ahead, Israel would be well placed to foment opposition to Sisi (perhaps using elements of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood) and provoke security instability in the Sinai – thus in effect distracting and detracting the Egyptian military from fully amassing its troops on the border for any possible intervention/confrontation in the future. 

It has to be recalled that the Sinai once hosted terrorist groups before such as the Wilayat Sinai or otherwise the Islamic State-Sinai Province (ISSP) during the height of the Arab Spring.

This is why, arguably, the ceasefire deal would allow for Israel to take stock and plan for the next stage, so to speak.

On the surface, it’s speculated that the Gaza ceasefire deal provides for the following:

• saving face and a boost for Trump’s image as dealmaker – the need to maintain and cement his reputation as someone who ends wars and conflicts;

• and concomitantly, allowing Trump to differentiate himself from Biden’s legacy;

• external legitimacy to Netanyahu (given the international pressure on and condemnation of the Zionist entity’s conduct in Gaza resulting in increasing isolation);

• “buying time” for Netanyahu and help regain the loss of the momentum for the normalisation of relations with Saudi Arabia and, by extension, the preservation and expansion of the Abraham Accords (which aligns with Trump’s own agenda for the Middle East); and

• some space for stalling or counter-balancing the Saudi-Iran rapprochement.

In short, the Gaza ceasefire is most probably for the sake of Trump mainly whilst providing breathing space for Netanyahu even though not necessarily on the latter’s own terms.

Although Trump has been contemptuous of Netanyahu (as shown in his social media posting of a video recording Professor Dr Jeffrey Sachs referring the Prime Minister of Israel in very crude terms), he’ll support the latter in the event the Gaza ceasefire deal breaks down. This includes the alluded annexation and military occupation.

It can’t be strongly emphasised enough that Netanyahu’s long-term goal aligns with Trump’s “vision” for Palestine, including notably Gaza, and the wider Middle East.

As he himself alongside Jared Kushner (his son-in-law and Middle East adviser) have openly stated before, the goal is to transform Gaza into a Riviera/Monaco – a coastline of luxury apartments and condos, hotels, boutiques, etc. Investments are expected to pour in from the Arab countries of the Abraham Accords.  Like Trump, Kushner is also in the real estate business.

In fact, it would seem that Trump might have just let the cat out of the bag last week by openly calling for Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan to take in the refugees (“Trump says Jordan, Egypt should take in Palestinians from Gaza; Egypt and Jordan push back”, Reuters, January 27, 2025).

At present, externally displacing the Gazans on a mass scale seems like an impossible task.

Short of external displacement, Gaza could well be subject to an internal apartheid system that parallels the West Bank. That is, the move from being the world’s largest open-air prison (singular) to the world’s most open-air prisons (plural).

Notwithstanding all that, Israel still hasn’t regained any meaningful strategic initiative post-1982 withdrawal from the Sinai.

This is because whilst assuming that the northern Sinai strip, including the coastal area, forms the buffer zone due to the externally displaced Gazan refugees, the “other half” of the Peninsula is still unobstructed.

And even though the northern Sinai strip provides the direct and natural pathway for a military invasion of Gaza, the mountainous topography in the central and southern parts allow for immobile stationed projectiles to be positioned under cover (i.e., reverse slope).

It can also serve as what Mount Hermon does now for Israel. That is, the mountains of Sinai allow the Egyptians the commanding heights for long-range observation points into Israel.

Southern Sinai also provides a suitable cover for an aerial invasion by Egypt. The mountain range can, in effect, serves to block air radar from detection. In a multi-front war, Israel would be hard-pressed to defend against a southern aerial invasion that comes as a complete surprise since some of the main air bases are mainly located in the Negev (e.g., Nevatim Air Base).

Assuming a concentration of Egyptian tank units crossing into the Negev already but on a wide or dispersed front, i.e., divided into separate groups and, by extension, routes which could double up as flanking movements, this could overwhelm the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positioned there.

In the final analysis, advancements in military technology of which ballistic missiles (BM) serve as an epitome (speed as well as range) also deprives Israel of the strategic initiative, regardless of the geographical front.

It goes without saying that a missile barrage can be more devastating than aerial attacks in quantitative terms.

In the same vein, it also renders any element of surprise which is an integral part of the strategic initiative moot since both sides are now on “equalised” terms, i.e., ability to strike each other from a longer-range distance. 

Lastly, any strategic depth is rendered obsolete if Israel is incapable of defending its civilian population from missile attacks.

This has been demonstrated even though on a much more modest scale in Operations True Promise 1 and 2 by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s medium-range (MRBM) Fattah hypersonic weapons system which reached Israeli cities and towns.



Jason Loh Seong Wei is Head of Social, Law & Human Rights at EMIR Research, an independent think tank focused on strategic policy recommendations based on rigorous research.

** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.