HTS is a designated terrorist organisation by the United Nations Security Council/UNSC (see UNSC Resolution 2254 which called for the prevention and suppression of terrorist acts committed by HTS’s predecessor, i.e., the Al-Nusra Front – an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda) and, by inclusion, the US State Department and the UK. But plans are currently afoot to lift the proscription by the US which was swift to drop its USD10 million bounty for the capture of Abu Mohammed Al-Golani whose real name is Ahmed Al-Sharaa.
The rapid advance or blitzkrieg by HTS towards Aleppo (as the “second” line of defence of the Syrian Arab Army/SAA) as well as Hama and Homs (as the two major centres of opposition to Bashar Al-Assad and Baathist rule) and finally the capture of Damascus on December 8, i.e., only after a week of unimpeded movement, resulting in the downfall of one of three state actors and nations of the Axis of Resistance (the other being the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ansarullah Yemen) raises the question of the continuing viability of that anti-Zionist coalition.
The alteration in the strategic equation in the multi-pronged conflict was further reinforced by the Zionist entity taking advantage of the total collapse of the SAA and departure of Bashar Al-Assad into exile in Moscow by moving out into the “rest” of the Golan Heights (and beyond).
On December 8, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a ground incursion which saw the occupation of the strategic peak of Mount Hermon as well as the entire demilitarised (and buffer) zone (DMZ) which constitutes the de facto border between the two countries in violation of the Disengagement Agreement (1974). There were claims that IDF tanks had advanced to within 16 miles (25 km) of Damascus also.
The DMZ comes under the watch of the UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) which is supported by the UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization)’s Observer Group Golan.
The IDF also seized areas beyond the DMZ including the strategic city of Quneitra (which includes the Al-Baath or New Quneitra). Illegally occupying the city and, by extension, the adjoining area not only allows Israel an added buffer zone (against any invasion) but simultaneously sends a signal that southwestern Syria is “off-limits” to the HTS, at least for the time being.
At the same time, the IDF unleashed intensive and extensive aerial as well as naval strikes at military targets (installations, depots, surface-to-air missile/SAM systems and other anti-aircraft batteries, airbases, MiG-23 and MiG-29 fighter jets, SU-22 fighter bombers and SU-24 tactical bombers, weapons production and storage facilities, OSA missile boats, etc.) in Syria. It’s been reported that Israel has carried out more than 350 strikes (“Israel seizing on Syria chaos to strike military assets”, BBC, December 12, 2024).
All in all, this represents what’d be a (reverse) scorched earth policy (as highlighted in EMIR Research article, “Zionist aggression: Some additional possible scenarios of a multi-front war”, October 28, 2024) – whereby the Zionist entity seeks to prevent/pre-empt a symmetrical war from taking shape and becoming a reality (as mentioned in EMIR Research articles, “Netanyahu’s “messianic vision” – be careful what you wish for”, October 16, 2024 and “Israel is preparing for a regional war – time to abolish the UNSC veto”, October 3, 2024).
Following this, as part of the (reverse) scorched earth policy, the IDF has also been laying defence-in-depth installations in the Golan Heights area to slow down the advance of any potential aggressor.
For example, the IDF has moved combat engineers and heavy equipment into the Golan Heights area and built at least 15 km of obstacles whose purpose is to delay the enemy for at least 40 minutes in case they want to invade Israel as reported by Brigadier General Yair Peli, commander of Division 210 responsible for the Syrian front (“Israeli Soldiers Deployed on the New Syrian Front Can't Say What the Future Holds”, Haaretz, December 11, 2024).
Although HTS has never been overtly hostile to Israel before and Abu Mohammed Al-Golani has stated that he seeks peaceful engagements with the Zionist entity, the complexity of the dynamics as conditioned by the diversity of state and non-state actors with both overlapping and conflicting interests means that the multi-front conflict equation may yet again shift.
Specifically, there’s still a (strong) possibility of Turkiye joining in the multi-front conflict in the future.
Despite Erdogan’s empty bellicose rhetoric so far and the covert cooperation with Israel as notably embodied by Turkiye’s supply of oil, it’s arguable that he’s playing the long game or double game.
Although his priority is political survival and, therefore, he’s playing safe, it could also be said that Erdogan knows full well that sooner or later that a clash and showdown with Israel is “inevitable”.
Perhaps the Zionist entity senses it too.
There’s no avoiding the fact that Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman expansionist ambition will come to head-to-head with Zionist expansionism (which also includes the Greater Israel project as a distinct sub-set) sometime in the future.
Critically, does this then mean that Erdogan would have something up his sleeve (i.e., a secret long-term plan/project)?
If so, this means a (further) loss of strategic initiative for Israel, at the end of the day.
And it can’t be strongly emphasised that the northern half of Syria, at least, which includes areas adjacent to the Golan Heights, is Turkiye’s “sphere of influence” due to historical and geopolitical reasons.
Historically, part of northern Syria is home to the Kurds whose compatriots in southeastern Turkiye are fighting an insurgency. Erdogan has been itching to suppress the Kurds in Rojava or otherwise known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to cut off what he deems to be support for Kurdish separatism (past) or rather autonomy (present-day) in southeastern Turkiye.
In practice and this is of significance on top of the thesis that Erodgan is playing the long game or double game, Turkiye doesn’t differentiates between separatism and autonomy and regards the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) which dominate the AANES as inseparable from the PKK.
With Israel expressing a desire to renew its ties with the Kurds as historical allies in the region, this further reinforces the “inexorability” of a clash with neo-Ottoman Turkey in the future albeit not yet imminent or looming.
For now, Turkiye has staked and needs to maintain its claim in/on Syria.
Geopolitically, Turkey would now consider Syria its client/satellite state and an extension and projection of its presence in the region that’s for all intents and purposes Arab-dominated in terms of population and culture and history.
With HTS under the tutelage of Turkiye and doing Erdogan’s bidding, this underscores and reinforces the (further) loss of strategic initiative for Israel.
The logic is simple.
If Turkiye is positioning itself to take the place or could even play the role of co-belligerent of the Axis of Resistance as a state actor in the future, then Syria under the new order combined with being an extension and projection of Turkiye follows suit and simply serves as a substitute for the old regime as both state and non-state actor in the struggle against Zionist occupation of Palestine.
In terms of operational effectiveness, Syria is Israel’s northeastern neighbour. Despite the virtually complete destruction of Syria’s military assets and infrastructure and the extension of Israel’s Golan Heights buffer zone, the strategic initiative gained is neutralised/netted out/off-set by the backing of Turkiye. Turkiye can always help to rebuild the military capability of the new Syria.
Turkiye’s situation is different from Syria under Bashar Al-Assad which was contented to providing military, technical and logistical support to Hezbollah.
Besides, Bashar Al-Assad had to contend with the complex of armed factions against his rule (ranging from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army/SNA to the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces/SDF and also encompassing ISIS and not least HTS, etc.) emanating mainly from the north of the country.
Turkiye’s expansionist dream and vision mean that duplicating the old Syrian regime’s strategy isn’t a viable option in the long-run.
The other half of the equation is (as mentioned by EMIR Research in the aforementioned articles) that the more Israel takes steps to pre-empt a multi-front (symmetrical) war, the more likely it’ll happen (in the future).
In short, the respective stances of Turkiye and Israel will only bring both into collision sooner or later.
In other words, far from a gain of strategic initiative, what we’re witnessing could well be the transitioning of Syria from a low-intensity or passive actor (in providing support to asymmetrical conflicts such as serving as a conduit for weaponry from Iran to Lebanon, etc.) to a high-intensity actor (i.e., actively engaging in either asymmetrical or even symmetrical warfare alongside Turkish forces).
Today Israel is confronted with a new reality despite the gains and wins from four successive wars in the past, including peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the proposed normalisation with Saudi Arabia in more recent times.
Under Erdogan, Israel can’t afford to discount a possible confrontation with Turkiye in the future.
Although Turkiye didn’t break off diplomatic ties with Israel but only trade relations were severed, Erdogan has a history of non-military action on behalf of the Palestinian cause.
Recall the Gaza flotilla operation in 2010 which was mainly sponsored by the Turkish Islamic non-governmental organization (NGO) close to Erdogan.
And Turkiye has now joined the Republic of South Africa’s legal proceeding (the “Application Instituting Proceedings” and the “Request for Indication of Provisional Measures”) against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which initially took place on December 29, 2023.
Turkiye has claimed to have also treated 1000 Hamas fighters in hospitals across the country (“Erdogan defends Hamas, says members are being treated in Turkish hospitals”, Reuters, May 13, 2024).
To recapitulate, it’s “only” Erdogan’s big talk of sending a military force to Israel to end the genocide in Gaza, etc. that never materialised.
However, will the non-military action eventually evolve or transmute into military action in the future?
Ultimately, Turkiye’s legitimacy as leader in the region and among the wider Muslim ummah rests on its determination or resolve to decisively reconcile its rhetoric with concrete action – symmetrical behaviour in terms of non-military action leading to a symmetrical war.
Whilst Erdogan is very careful not to show his hand (for now), will he finally make a real U-turn sometime in the future?
Jason Loh Seong Wei is Head of Social, Law & Human Rights at EMIR Research, an independent think tank focussed on strategic policy recommendations based on rigorous research.
** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.
