SINCE the US-brokered 2020 Abraham Accord, which saw the normalisation of relations between Israel and several Gulf states, the nature of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel has been a subject of significant geopolitical speculation. While no official normalisation has occurred between the two countries, there have been reports of discreet diplomatic engagements. However, the potential for increased cooperation between the two countries has raised a heated discourse about its impact on Middle Eastern dynamics, regional stability, and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The pressure for normalisation is partly due to the efforts by the United States to see it happen. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken made formal and public promises to prominent Jewish lobby groups in the US, including the American Israel Public Affairs (AIPAC) and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, to broker diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. He argued that this was part of President Biden’s administration's strategy to achieve national security interests. He has also made official visits to Saudi Arabia with the overt objective of encouraging enhanced Saudi-Israel relations.

Several issues seem to be impeding normalisation efforts. One of the most important is Riyadh's insistence on abiding by Arab Peace Initiative resolutions, which include a call for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, and a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee problem based on UN Resolution 194.

Even though Israel desperately seeks formal relations with Saudi Arabia, the above demands are unacceptable to Netanyahu’s government. For many Israeli leaders, any deal forsaking their occupied land in the West Bank and concessions to Palestinian rights would be unacceptable.

Although Saudi Arabia appears to support Palestine based on the above demands, there are reasons to question its sincerity due to its ambiguous stance and refusal to dismiss any possibility of normalisation with Israel outrightly.

To gain a deeper understanding of Saudi Arabia's convoluted stance on the normalisation issue, an understanding of the history of the country's foreign policy approach is necessary. Central to Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has always been its pursuit of national interests, driven by the ambitious aim to assume a leading role in coordinating regional geopolitics between the Middle East and the United States. However, rather than emulating the assertive regional leadership of figures like Gamal Abd al-Nasir's Egypt during his Pan-Arabism era, Saudi Arabia has opted for a more diplomatic trajectory in its dealings with neighbouring states. Saudi Arabia understands its limitations regarding historical legacy, cultural heritage, and military strength compared to other aspiring regional powers vying for a more totalitarian role. It, therefore, decided to play the role of regional conflict mediator as a strategy to achieve national security. By using its immense wealth, Saudi Arabia successfully positioned itself as an indispensable conciliator not only within the Middle East and among Arab nations but also in its interactions with the United States. This strategy has benefited the country by strengthening its oil-related ties with the U.S.

Two Saudi initiatives illustrate its stance - the Arab peace initiative and the Fahd Plan. The Fahd Plan was introduced in 1976 after Saudi successfully diffused the tension between leaders of Egypt and Syria through the implementation of the Sinai Interim Agreement when Egypt refrained from criticizing Syria’s invasion of Lebanon in return for Syria ending its condemnation of Egypt's diplomatic agreement with Israel.

Saudi’s success in brokering the agreement encouraged it to initiate a unified Arab position towards Israel that would rely on peace arrangements involving Egypt, Syria, and Saudi. The unified position was later derailed by Egypt when it decided to pursue bilateral peace with Israel first through the Camp David Accords.

As a result, the Arab League decided to suspend Egypt's membership. However, the Saudis again demonstrated its relatively accommodating attitude toward Israel and its lack of concern for Palestinian rights when it attempted to dissuade the Arab League from penalising Egypt.

After these incidences, Crown Prince Fahd embarked on a new peace initiative involving Arab nations, whose goal was to establish a framework that would garner Arab trust and unity, necessitating the inclusion of fundamental Palestinian rights through the introduction of novel components into proposed resolutions, notably a call for Israel to withdraw its armed forces from all territories occupied since the six-day war in 1967.

Initially, the reception of the revamped Fahd Plan encountered obstacles. Arab states offered insufficient support, and Syria strongly opposed it. However, the plan eventually received a warmer reception due to factors such as the weakening of the Syrian regime and heightened interest from the United States. The plan also underwent some modifications, notably the incorporation of a provision that the United Nations Security Council would guarantee peace across all regional states and establish an independent Palestinian state. This plan eventually laid the essential groundwork for the subsequent Arab Peace Initiative, a framework that Saudi Arabia continues to endorse.

In this context, Saudi Arabia's endeavour to bring together all three parties - Arab states, Israel, and the United States – further underscores its role as a mediator, striving for amicable relations and being friendly with each party.

Notably, this friendlier stance extends to Israel as well, as Saudi Arabia seeks to prevent any interference or disruption from the Israeli lobby within the United States regarding potential agreements with the U.S. This intention becomes evident from past incidents, such as Saudi Arabia's pursuit of advanced AWACS aeroplanes from the United States, which faced opposition due to concerns from the Israeli lobbyist.
In recent years, spanning the last decade, the rapport between Saudi Arabia and Israel has been steadily advancing, mainly covertly, but signifying an incremental shift towards endorsing measures for normalisation. The driving force behind this rapprochement is the unease over Iran’s aspiration to establish regional dominance in the form of its potential to acquire nuclear weapons, its sponsorship of attacks against Israel, proxy attacks on Saudi - such as through their Houthi ally in Yemen, and increased military and political presence in Syria.

Interestingly, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi recently applauded Saudi and cordially described their relationship as influential in the region with hopeful remarks of increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, Saudi’s worry is still intense, forcing it to reevaluate its risk assessment and prioritize its security and national interest over the Palestinian cause.

Most top diplomats are doubtful that any Saudi-Israel normalisation deal would come to fruition in the short term. In the long term, it will depend on Israel’s willingness to compromise on demands for any form of a Palestinian state and the United States' aptitude in offering an acceptable deal to counter China’s influence since China is also displaying interest in interjecting into the Muslim world, offering Saudi an alternative deal for security and development, as well as successfully brokering diplomatic ties between Saudi and Iran.

In conclusion, most Palestinian advocates are justified in their scepticism of Saudi’s commitment towards the Palestinian cause. For the Saudis, the Palestinian issue only serves as leverage to acquire more lucrative deals from the United States. In the end, the Saudis will likely stop short of full normalisation because they are also aware that such a move will result in them losing the respect of the entire Muslim world and risking a violent backlash from its pro-Palestinian citizens. 

* Prof Nazari Ismail is the director of the Hashim Sani Centre for Palestine Studies, University of Malaya. Ahmad Hani Hariza is currently doing his internship at the centre. 

** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.