Trump’s tariffs on India will make Delhi only closer to Beijing and BRICS

The venue is Tianjin, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit—a setting that only years ago might have been inconceivable for Modi amid the backdrop of the Galwan Valley clash in 2020.

Yet, with Donald Trump back in the White House and the United States unleashing another wave of economic hostilities, this visit is not simply a bilateral thaw.

It marks India’s clearest move yet to reshape its geoeconomic destiny away from the overreach of Western exceptionalism and toward the deeper structural security of BRICS.

At the core of India’s diplomatic pivot is a profound sense of betrayal—by the United States and, more broadly, the West.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, India has been repeatedly targeted for its continued imports of Russian oil. What Western critics conveniently ignore, however, is that India purchased less than 2 percent of its oil and gas from Russia before the war.

It was only when the United States and the European Union imposed sweeping sanctions and created an artificial void in the global energy market that India stepped in—not just to secure affordable energy for its 1.4 billion people, but to stabilize global supply chains.

And here lies the strategic hypocrisy: while India is being chastised for legally buying discounted Russian oil, European nations have continued to import the same oil and gas—via India.

Through a complex but transparent network of middlemen and refineries, Indian firms reprocess Russian crude into refined products such as diesel and jet fuel, which are then sold to Europe, often at premium prices. Brussels is fully aware of this mechanism.

Yet instead of thanking Delhi for helping to insulate Europe from energy shock, Washington and Brussels have turned India into a scapegoat, imposing or supporting punitive tariffs and issuing regular diplomatic warnings.

This duplicity has deepened India’s conviction that the West’s calls for a “rules-based order” are merely a function of self-interest.

If the European Union can buy Russian-origin energy via India, and if the U.S. can tolerate indirect purchases when it suits its allies, then what exactly are the rules—and who gets to write them?

Against this backdrop, the new U.S. tariffs of up to 50 percent on Indian goods—imposed under Trump’s second presidency—represent a breaking point. The official justification, predictably, is India’s continued energy trade with Russia.

But there’s more to it. India’s USD 45 billion trade surplus with the United States has long been a thorn in Trump’s side, even though it reflects competitive efficiencies rather than currency manipulation or dumping.

Thus, Modi’s visit to China is more than symbolic; it is strategic.

For all India’s discomfort with China’s enduring embrace of Pakistan—a country that ironically has warmed to the Trump Administration—Modi is now compelled to engage with Beijing and deepen alignment within BRICS.

India is no longer willing to accept Western economic coercion while being simultaneously instrumentalized in larger geopolitical rivalries.

Within BRICS—now expanded to include Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, and Argentina—India finds itself in increasingly ideological and structural consonance with its fellow members.

Brazil, under President Lula da Silva, has also locked horns with Washington over issues ranging from monetary sovereignty to climate finance, deepening the anti-Western undercurrent within the bloc.

With Brazil, South Africa and Russia all advocating for de-dollarization coupled with their leading calls for a multipolar world order, BRICS is becoming an axis of resistance to Western dominance.

Not only in military and political terms, but through economic architecture, development finance, and common rejection of US and EU's double standards.

India’s strategic outlook has matured. While it remains deeply suspicious of China’s behaviour in the Indo-Pacific and its military posture in the Himalayas, Delhi is increasingly aware that the so-called liberal order no longer offers either fairness or predictability.

In trade, tech, and energy, the West has used its power to discipline rather than empower India. The tariffs under Trump are only the most recent manifestation of this broader trend.

For ASEAN, this pivot is instructive.

Malaysia, indeed, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines's own success in negotiating a tariff-reducing deal with Washington proves that regional powers can leverage their geopolitical relevance—but only if they possess strategic clarity.

Trump 's aversion to each member state that pioneered the creation of BRICS has helped the latter to gain more traction.

India is now doing the same, turning economic punishment into diplomatic opportunity. The East Asia Summit in October 2025 will reflect this shift.

With India more firmly embedded in BRICS and China extending olive branches via the SCO and other plurilateral forums, Asia may finally be asserting its own grammar of diplomacy—free of Western syntax.

The SCO Summit may not resolve the border disputes between India and China, nor will it erase decades of mistrust. BRICS, however, is increasingly more concrete than ever.

If anything, Trump's tariff caper does allow both countries—China and India to engage on common terms: energy security, digital sovereignty, de-dollarization, and equitable development.

These are not mere slogans—they are emerging norms, increasingly detached from Western oversight.

In truth, it is not Chinese charm but American pressure that is forcing India to reconsider its alignments.

A nation once courted as the cornerstone of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy now finds itself punished and alienated.

And in this paradox lies the future: India’s return to Tianjin is not a retreat, but an advance—toward a multipolar, post-Western order where it can finally assert its autonomy without apology.

The irony is sharp, but the lesson is clear. Trump’s tariffs have not weakened India’s resolve. They have only clarified where its true opportunities lie: not in obedience to the West, but in solidarity with BRICS.

And as that coalition strengthens—with India playing a central role—the world will soon realize that the new balance of power is no longer transatlantic. It is Eurasian, Southern, and unapologetically plural.